Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

Competition between evaporation and fragmentation in nuclear reactions at 15-20 AMeV beam energy

The reactions 32S+58,64Ni are studied at 14.5 AMeV. From this energy on, fragmentation begins to be a dominant process, although evaporation and fission are still present. After a selection of the collision mechanism, we show that important even-odd effects are present in the isotopic fragment distributions when the excitation energy is small. The staggering effect appears to be a universal feature of fragment production, slightly enhanced when the emission source is neutron poor. A closer look at the behavior of isotopic chains reveals that odd-even effects cannot be explained by pairing effects in the nuclear mass alone, but depend in a more complex way on the de-excitation chain.

Cooperation and competition in the air transport market: current scenario, possible evolutions and analytical tools

dall'avvento della liberalizzazione, aeroporti e vettori hanno vissuto cambiamenti. Il maggior miglioramneto nella gestione degli aeroporti è una gestione più commerciale ed efficiente. Le forme di regolazione economica e le caratteristiche della gestione manageriale sono state indagate. Dodici paesi sono stati scelti per indagare la situazione del trasporto aereo mondiale, fra questi sia paesi con un sistema maturo sia paesi emergenti. La distribuzione del traffico è stata analizzata con l'indice HHI per evidenziare aeroporti con concentrazione maggiore di 0,25 (in accordo con la normativa statunitense); il sistema aeroportuale è stato analizzato con l'indice di Gini e con l'indice di dominanza. Infine, la teoria dei giochi si è dimostrata un valido supporto per studiare il mercato del trasporto aereo anche con l'uso di giochi di tipo DP

Clinicopathologic findings in thoroughbred horses during a high speed – short term competition

The aim of this study was to examine whether a real high speed-short term competition influences clinicopathological data focusing on muscle enzymes, iron profile and Acute Phase Proteins. 30 Thoroughbred racing horses (15 geldings and 15 females) aged between 4-12 years (mean 7 years), were used for the study. All the animals performed a high speed-short term competition for a total distance of 154 m in about 12 seconds, repeated 8 times, within approximately one hour (Niballo Horse Race). Blood samples were obtained 24 hours before and within 30 minutes after the end of the races. On all samples were performed a complete blood count (CBC), biochemical and haemostatic profiles. The post-race concentrations for the single parameter were corrected using an estimation of the plasma volume contraction according to the individual Alb concentration. Data were analysed with descriptive statistics and the percentage of variation from the baseline values were recorded. Pre- and post-race results were compared with non-parametric statistics (Mann Whitney U test). A difference was considered significant at p<0.05. A significant plasma volume contraction after the race was detected (Hct, Alb; p<0.01). Other relevant findings were increased concentrations of muscular enzymes (CK, LDH; p<0.01), Crt (p<0.01), significant increased uric acid (p<0.01), a significant decrease of haptoglobin (p<0.01) associated to an increase of ferritin concentrations (p<0.01), significant decrease of fibrinogen (p<0.05) accompanied by a non-significant increase of D-Dimers concentrations (p=0.08). This competition produced relevant abnormalities on clinical pathology in galloping horses. This study confirms a significant muscular damage, oxidative stress, intravascular haemolysis and subclinical hemostatic alterations. Further studies are needed to better understand the pathogenesis, the medical relevance and the impact on performance of these alterations in equine sport medicine.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.