In campo. Il ruolo pubblico dell'antropologia

La tesi riflette sulla necessità di un ripensamento delle scienze antropologiche nel senso di un loro uso pubblico e del loro riconoscimento al di fuori dell’accademia. Viene introdotto il dibattito sulla dimensione applicata dell’antropologia a partire dalle posizioni in campo nel panorama internazionale. Negli Stati Uniti la riflessione si sviluppa dalla proposta della public anthropology, l’antropologo pubblico si discosta dalla tradizionale figura europea di intellettuale pubblico. Alla luce delle varie posizioni in merito, la questione dell’applicazione è esaminata dal punto di vista etico, metodologico ed epistemologico. Inizialmente vengono prese in considerazione le diverse metodologie elaborate dalla tradizione dell’applied anthropology a partire dalle prime proposte risalenti al secondo dopoguerra. Successivamente viene trattata la questione del rapporto tra antropologia, potere coloniale e forze armate, fino al recente caso degli antropologi embedded nello Human Terrain System. Come contraltare vengono presentate le diverse forme di engagement antropologico che vedono ricercatori assumere diversi ruoli fino a casi estremi che li vedono divenire attivisti delle cause degli interlocutori. La questione del ruolo giocato dal ricercatore, e di quello che gli viene attribuito sul campo, viene approfondita attraverso la categoria di implication elaborata in contesto francese. Attraverso alcune esperienze di campo vengono presentate forme di intervento concreto nel panorama italiano che vogliono mettere in luce l’azione dell’antropologo nella società. Infine viene affrontato il dibattito, in corso in Italia, alla luce della crisi che sta vivendo la disciplina e del lavoro per la costituzione dell’associazione nazionale di antropologia professionale.

Medical Malpractice in Public Healthcare Systems: An Empirical Investigation of Scheduled Damages

In the last decades, medical malpractice has been framed as one of the most critical issues for healthcare providers and health policy, holding a central role on both the policy agenda and public debate. The Law and Economics literature has devoted much attention to medical malpractice and to the investigation of the impact of malpractice reforms. Nonetheless, some reforms have been much less empirically studied as in the case of schedules, and their effects remain highly debated. The present work seeks to contribute to the study of medical malpractice and of schedules of noneconomic damages in a civil law country with a public national health system, using Italy as case study. Besides considering schedules and exploiting a quasi-experimental setting, the novelty of our contribution consists in the inclusion of the performance of the judiciary (measured as courts’ civil backlog) in the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis is twofold. First, it investigates how limiting compensations for pain and suffering through schedules impacts on the malpractice insurance market in terms of presence of private insurers and of premiums applied. Second, it examines whether, and to what extent, healthcare providers react to the implementation of this policy in terms of both levels and composition of the medical treatments offered. Our findings show that the introduction of schedules increases the presence of insurers only in inefficient courts, while it does not produce significant effects on paid premiums. Judicial inefficiency is attractive to insurers for average values of schedules penetration of the market, with an increasing positive impact of inefficiency as the territorial coverage of schedules increases. Moreover, the implementation of schedules tends to reduce the use of defensive practices on the part of clinicians, but the magnitude of this impact is ultimately determined by the actual degree of backlog of the court implementing schedules.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Social Welfare and Behavioral Public Policies

In this work I discuss several key aspects of welfare economics and policy analysis and I propose two original contributions to the growing field of behavioral public policymaking. After providing a historical perspective of welfare economics and an overview of policy analysis processes in the introductory chapter, in chapter 2 I discuss a debated issue of policymaking, the choice of the social welfare function. I contribute to this debate by proposing an original methodological contribution based on the analysis of the quantitative relationship among different social welfare functional forms commonly used by policy analysts. In chapter 3 I then discuss a behavioral policy to contrast indirect tax evasion based on the use of lotteries. I show that the predictions of my model based on non-expected utility are consistent with observed, and so far unexplained, empirical evidence of the policy success. Finally, in chapter 4 I investigate by mean of a laboratory experiment the effects of social influence on the individual likelihood to engage in altruistic punishment. I show that bystanders’ decision to engage in punishment is influenced by the punishment behavior of their peers and I suggest ways to enact behavioral policies that exploit this finding.