Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

An analysis of the regulatory chill hypothesis: environmental protection in international investment law

The goal of this thesis has been to find out whether ISDS and international investment law exert a chilling effect on more stringent environmental standards at the domestic level. Due to the lack of consistent empirical and statistical evidence uncovered during the analysis, this thesis largely dismisses the regulatory chill hypothesis. However, two exceptions are identified: first, there is evidence of the efforts made by domestic industrial groups and trade unions to prevent the implementation of stricter environmental standards; second, it has become apparent that unfounded beliefs, e.g. about ISDS, held by lawmakers and regulators can play an important role in chilling stricter environmental standards. For these reasons, a new and narrower definition of the regulatory chill phenomenon has been proposed, one that only encompasses those instances in which lawmakers, governments and government agencies refrain from adopting the laws and regulations that they deem the most appropriate because they believe that doing so would lead to adverse consequences at the international trade and investment level, despite a lack of consistent and robust evidence supporting their concerns. The second part of this thesis focusses on what could be done in international economic law to promote environmentally friendly FDI, while preventing the few instances in which regulatory chill may take place due to ill-founded beliefs held by lawmakers and regulators. Following an analysis that highlights the paramount role played by public participation and responsive institutions to achieve an appropriate level of environmental protection, this study ends with a proposal that recommends the adoption of a clause within IIAs that makes pre-investment environmental screening mandatory and free from ISDS oversight.

Internet of healthcare (law): privacy and data protection aspects in an internet of everything

The purpose of this research study is to discuss privacy and data protection-related regulatory and compliance challenges posed by digital transformation in healthcare in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The public health crisis accelerated the development of patient-centred remote/hybrid healthcare delivery models that make increased use of telehealth services and related digital solutions. The large-scale uptake of IoT-enabled medical devices and wellness applications, and the offering of healthcare services via healthcare platforms (online doctor marketplaces) have catalysed these developments. However, the use of new enabling technologies (IoT, AI) and the platformisation of healthcare pose complex challenges to the protection of patient’s privacy and personal data. This happens at a time when the EU is drawing up a new regulatory landscape for the use of data and digital technologies. Against this background, the study presents an interdisciplinary (normative and technology-oriented) critical assessment on how the new regulatory framework may affect privacy and data protection requirements regarding the deployment and use of Internet of Health Things (hardware) devices and interconnected software (AI systems). The study also assesses key privacy and data protection challenges that affect healthcare platforms (online doctor marketplaces) in their offering of video API-enabled teleconsultation services and their (anticipated) integration into the European Health Data Space. The overall conclusion of the study is that regulatory deficiencies may create integrity risks for the protection of privacy and personal data in telehealth due to uncertainties about the proper interplay, legal effects and effectiveness of (existing and proposed) EU legislation. The proliferation of normative measures may increase compliance costs, hinder innovation and ultimately, deprive European patients from state-of-the-art digital health technologies, which is paradoxically, the opposite of what the EU plans to achieve.