Understanding the Combined Role of Internal and External Factors in New Service Development Process within the Professional Knowledge Intensive Business Service Firms

Our research asked the following main questions: how the characteristics of professionals service firms allow them to successfully innovate in exploiting through exploring by combining internal and external factors of innovation and how these ambidextrous organisations perceive these factors; and how do successful innovators in professional service firms use corporate entrepreneurship models in their new service development processes? With a goal to shed light on innovation in professional knowledge intensive business service firms’ (PKIBS), we concluded a qualitative analysis of ten globally acting law firms, providing business legal services. We analyse the internal and factors of innovation that are critical for PKIBS’ innovation. We suggest how these firms become ambidextrous in changing environment. Our findings show that this kind of firms has particular type of ambidexterity due to their specific characteristics. As PKIBS are very dependant on its human capital, governance structure, and the high expectations of their clients, their ambidexterity is structural, but also contextual at the same time. In addition, we suggest 3 types of corporate entrepreneurship models that international PKIBS use to enhance innovation in turbulent environments. We looked at how law firms going through turbulent environments were using corporate entrepreneurship activities as a part of their strategies to be more innovative. Using visual mapping methodology, we developed three types of innovation patterns in the law firms. We suggest that corporate entrepreneurship models depend on successful application of mainly three elements: who participates in corporate entrepreneurship initiatives; what are the formal processes that enhances these initiatives; and what are the policies applied to this type of behaviour.

Multi-Principal Agency and the Compliance with Professional Guidelines in Health Systems: Economic and Regulatory Perspectives

Amid the trend of rising health expenditure in developed economies, changing the healthcare delivery models is an important point of action for service regulators to contain this trend. Such a change is mostly induced by either financial incentives or regulatory tools issued by the regulators and targeting service providers and patients. This creates a tripartite interaction between service regulators, professionals, and patients that manifests a multi-principal agent relationship, in which professionals are agents to two principals: regulators and patients. This thesis is concerned with such a multi-principal agent relationship in healthcare and attempts to investigate the determinants of the (non-)compliance to regulatory tools in light of this tripartite relationship. In addition, the thesis provides insights into the different institutional, economic, and regulatory settings, which govern the multi-principal agent relationship in healthcare in different countries. Furthermore, the thesis provides and empirically tests a conceptual framework of the possible determinants of (non-)compliance by physicians to regulatory tools issued by the regulator. The main findings of the thesis are first, in a multi-principal agent setting, the utilization of financial incentives to align the objectives of professionals and the regulator is important but not the only solution. This finding is based on the heterogeneity in the financial incentives provided to professionals in different health markets, which does not provide a one-size-fits-all model of financial incentives to influence clinical decisions. Second, soft law tools as clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are important tools to mitigate the problems of the multi-principal agent setting in health markets as they reduce information asymmetries while preserving the autonomy of professionals. Third, CPGs are complex and heterogeneous and so are the determinants of (non-)compliance to them. Fourth, CPGs work but under conditions. Factors such as intra-professional competition between service providers or practitioners might lead to non-compliance to CPGs – if CPGs are likely to reduce the professional’s utility. Finally, different degrees of soft law mandate have different effects on providers’ compliance. Generally, the stronger the mandate, the stronger the compliance, however, even with a strong mandate, drivers such as intra-professional competition and co-management of patients by different professionals affected the (non-)compliance.