La Pace Calda. La nascita del movimento antinucleare negli Stati Uniti e in Gran Bretagna, 1957-1963

The aim of this proposal is to offer an alternative perspective on the study of Cold War, since insufficient attention is usually paid to those organizations that mobilized against the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The antinuclear movement began to mobilize between the 1950s and the 1960s, when it finally gained the attention of public opinion, and helped to build a sort of global conscience about nuclear bombs. This was due to the activism of a significant part of the international scientific community, which offered powerful intellectual and political legitimization to the struggle, and to the combined actions of the scientific and organized protests. This antinuclear conscience is something we usually tend to consider as a fait accompli in contemporary world, but the question is to show its roots, and the way it influenced statesmen and political choices during the period of nuclear confrontation of the early Cold War. To understand what this conscience could be and how it should be defined, we have to look at the very meaning of the nuclear weapons that has deeply modified the sense of war. Nuclear weapons seemed to be able to destroy human beings everywhere with no realistic forms of control of the damages they could set off, and they represented the last resource in the wide range of means of mass destruction. Even if we tend to consider this idea fully rational and incontrovertible, it was not immediately born with the birth of nuclear weapons themselves. Or, better, not everyone in the world did immediately share it. Due to the particular climate of Cold War confrontation, deeply influenced by the persistence of realistic paradigms in international relations, British and U.S. governments looked at nuclear weapons simply as «a bullet». From the Trinity Test to the signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, many things happened that helped to shift this view upon nuclear weapons. First of all, more than ten years of scientific protests provided a more concerned knowledge about consequences of nuclear tests and about the use of nuclear weapons. Many scientists devoted their social activities to inform public opinion and policy-makers about the real significance of the power of the atom and the related danger for human beings. Secondly, some public figures, as physicists, philosophers, biologists, chemists, and so on, appealed directly to the human community to «leave the folly and face reality», publicly sponsoring the antinuclear conscience. Then, several organizations leaded by political, religious or radical individuals gave to this protests a formal structure. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain, as well as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in the U.S., represented the voice of the masses against the attempts of governments to present nuclear arsenals as a fundamental part of the international equilibrium. Therefore, the antinuclear conscience could be defined as an opposite feeling to the development and the use of nuclear weapons, able to create a political issue oriented to the influence of military and foreign policies. Only taking into consideration the strength of this pressure, it seems possible to understand not only the beginning of nuclear negotiations, but also the reasons that permitted Cold War to remain cold.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

Essays on the Empirical Analysis of Economic and Political Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa, non-democratic events, like civil wars and coup d'etat, destroy economic development. This study investigates both domestic and spatial effects on the likelihood of civil wars and coup d'etat. To civil wars, an increase of income growth is one of common research conclusions to stop wars. This study adds a concern on ethnic fractionalization. IV-2SLS is applied to overcome causality problem. The findings document that income growth is significant to reduce number and degree of violence in high ethnic fractionalized countries, otherwise they are trade-off. Income growth reduces amount of wars, but increases its violent level, in the countries with few large ethnic groups. Promoting growth should consider ethnic composition. This study also investigates the clustering and contagion of civil wars using spatial panel data models. Onset, incidence and end of civil conflicts spread across the network of neighboring countries while peace, the end of conflicts, diffuse only with the nearest neighbor. There is an evidence of indirect links from neighboring income growth, without too much inequality, to reduce the likelihood of civil wars. To coup d'etat, this study revisits its diffusion for both all types of coups and only successful ones. The results find an existence of both domestic and spatial determinants in different periods. Domestic income growth plays major role to reduce the likelihood of coup before cold war ends, while spatial effects do negative afterward. Results on probability to succeed coup are similar. After cold war ends, international organisations seriously promote democracy with pressure against coup d'etat, and it seems to be effective. In sum, this study indicates the role of domestic ethnic fractionalization and the spread of neighboring effects to the likelihood of non-democratic events in a country. Policy implementation should concern these factors.

Cattolici e liberali dall'antifascismo alla seconda guerra mondiale (1925-1943)

Il quadro tematico della tesi è la storia politica e culturale delle relazioni tra il cattolicesimo democratico di origine «popolare» e la tradizione del liberalismo italiano, in un arco cronologico compreso tra l’antifascismo dell’Aventino e la fondazione della Democrazia Cristiana. L’ipotesi della ricerca è che proprio in questo «lungo viaggio» la classe dirigente del cattolicesimo politico (a cominciare dalla leadership di Alcide De Gasperi) abbia completato quel processo di acculturazione in senso «liberale» che le avrebbe consentito di guidare consensualmente l’uscita dal fascismo nel secondo dopoguerra.

Il Presidente della Repubblica in Albania tra evoluzione della forma di Stato e formale adozione del modello Italiano

La ricerca analizza la forma di Stato e di Governo e si focalizza nel ruolo importante del Capo dello Stato in funzione alla separazione dei poteri e consolidamento della democrazia in una Repubblica Parlamentare. Questa ricerca comparativa analizza l’evoluzione della forma di governo in Italia e Albania. La ricerca analizza nei dettagli l’evoluzione della forma di Governo, focalizzandosi all’istituzione del Capo dello Stato in Albania dall’indipendenza (1912), evidenziando il ruolo dell’Italia in quest’evoluzione. In maniera comparativa si analizza l’evoluzione dell’istituzione del Capo dello Stato in Italia fin dalla sua unita e gli altri sviluppi i quali servirono come modello per l’Albania, evidenziano l’influenza a livello internazionale che ebbe l’Italia per l’indipendenza dell’Albania, che portò al consolidamento dei loro rapporti. Questa ricerca analizza la collaborazione di questi due Stati la quale culmino con la loro Unione Personale identificandosi nello stesso Capo di Stato. La ricerca inoltre evidenzia che come questa fase sia stata superata dalla II Guerra Mondiale e la Guerra Fredda che vide questi Stati a sviluppare diverse forme di Governo. Per di più la ricerca evidenzia la trasformazione politico-istituzionale e il processo di cambiamento dell’Albania dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino che segno la fine del sistema comunista, che vide l’Albania ad adottare il modello Italiano per il Capo dello Stato.

L'amministrazione Johnson e le origini della distensione. 1964-1968

La tesi analizza una parte della politica estera dell’amministrazione Johnson, e più specificamente l’avvio del dialogo con l’Urss in materia di non proliferazione e controllo degli armamenti e la revisione della China policy, inquadrando entrambe nell’adattamento della cold war strategy all’evoluzione sistema internazionale, argomentando che la distensione intesa come rilassamento delle tensioni e ricerca di terreno comune per il dialogo, fosse perlomeno uno degli strumenti politici che l’amministrazione scelse di usare. Il primo capitolo analizza i cambiamenti che interessarono il Blocco sovietico e il movimento comunista internazionale tra la fine degli anni Cinquanta e l’inizio degli anni Sessanta, soprattutto la rottura dell’alleanza sino-sovietica, e l’impatto che essi ebbero sul sistema bipolare su cui si basava la Guerra Fredda. Il capitolo secondo affronta più specificamente l’evoluzione delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica, il perseguimento di una politica di distensione, dopo la crisi dei missili cubani, e in che relazione si trovasse ciò con lo status della leadership sovietica a seguito dei cambiamenti che avevano avuto luogo. Soffermandosi sulla questione del controllo degli armamenti e sul percorso che portò alla firma del Trattato di Non-proliferazione, si analizza come la nuova rotta intrapresa col dialogo sulle questioni strategiche sia stato anche un cambiamento di rotta in generale nella concezione della Guerra Fredda e l’introduzione della distensione come strumento politico. Il terzo capitolo affronta la questione della modifica della politica verso Pechino e il processo tortuoso e contorto attraverso cui l’amministrazione Johnson giunse a distaccarsi dalla China policy seguita sino ad allora.