Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Novel investigation methods in Computational Social Dynamics and Complex Systems

In this thesis the evolution of the techno-social systems analysis methods will be reported, through the explanation of the various research experience directly faced. The first case presented is a research based on data mining of a dataset of words association named Human Brain Cloud: validation will be faced and, also through a non-trivial modeling, a better understanding of language properties will be presented. Then, a real complex system experiment will be introduced: the WideNoise experiment in the context of the EveryAware european project. The project and the experiment course will be illustrated and data analysis will be displayed. Then the Experimental Tribe platform for social computation will be introduced . It has been conceived to help researchers in the implementation of web experiments, and aims also to catalyze the cumulative growth of experimental methodologies and the standardization of tools cited above. In the last part, three other research experience which already took place on the Experimental Tribe platform will be discussed in detail, from the design of the experiment to the analysis of the results and, eventually, to the modeling of the systems involved. The experiments are: CityRace, about the measurement of human traffic-facing strategies; laPENSOcosì, aiming to unveil the political opinion structure; AirProbe, implemented again in the EveryAware project framework, which consisted in monitoring air quality opinion shift of a community informed about local air pollution. At the end, the evolution of the technosocial systems investigation methods shall emerge together with the opportunities and the threats offered by this new scientific path.