The Making of a Shiite Bourgeoisie in Lebanon Political Mobilisation, Economic Resources and Formation of a Social Group

The thesis analyses the making of the Shiite middle- and upper/entrepreneurial-class in Lebanon from the 1960s till the present day. The trajectory explores the historical, political and social (internal and external) factors that brought a sub-proletariat to mobilise and become an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in the span of less than three generations. This work proposes the main theoretical hypothesis to unpack and reveal the trajectory of a very recent social class that through education, diaspora, political and social mobilisation evolved in a few years into a very peculiar bourgeoisie: whereas Christian-Maronite middle class practically produced political formations and benefited from them and from Maronite’s state supremacy (National Pact, 1943) reinforcing the community’s status quo, Shiites built their own bourgeoisie from within, and mobilised their “cadres” (Boltanski) not just to benefit from their renovated presence at the state level, but to oppose to it. The general Social Movement Theory (SMT), as well as a vast amount of the literature on (middle) class formation are therefore largely contradicted, opening up new territories for discussion on how to build a bourgeoisie without the state’s support (Social Mobilisation Theory, Resource Mobilisation Theory) and if, eventually, the middle class always produces democratic movements (the emergence of a social group out of backwardness and isolation into near dominance of a political order). The middle/upper class described here is at once an economic class related to the control of multiple forms of capital, and produced by local, national, and transnational networks related to flows of services, money, and education, and a culturally constructed social location and identity structured by economic as well as other forms of capital in relation to other groups in Lebanon.

Experiments on Pro-Sociality and Environmental Issues

The thesis comprises three essays that use experimental methods, one about other-regarding motivations in economic behavior and the others on pro-social behavior in two environmental economics problems. The first chapter studies how the expectations of the others and the concern to maintain a balance between effort exerted and rewards obtained interact in shaping the behavior in a modified dictator game. We find that dictators condition their choices on recipients' expectations only when there is a high probability that the the recipient will not be compensated for her effort. Otherwise, dictators tend to balance the efforts and rewards of the recipients, irrespective of the recipients' expectations. In the second chapter, I investigate the problem of local opposition to large public projects (e.g. landfills, incinerators, etc.). In particular, the experiment shows how the uncertainty about the project's quality makes the community living in the host site skeptical about the project. I also test whether side-transfers and costly information disclosure can help to increase the efficiency. Both tools succesfully make the host more willing to accept the project, but they lead to the realization of different types of projects. The last chapter is an experiment on climate negotiations. To avoid the global warming, countries are called to cooperate in the abatement of their emissions. We study whether the dynamic aspect of the climate change makes cooperation across countries behaviorally more difficult. We also consider inequality across countries as a possible factor that hinders international cooperation.