4 resultados para Patent system
em AMS Tesi di Dottorato - Alm@DL - Università di Bologna
Resumo:
The study aims at providing a framework conceptualizing patenting activities under the condition of intellectual property rights fragmentation. Such a framework has to deal with the interrelated problems of technological complexity in the modern patent landscape. In that respect, ex-post licensing agreements have been incorporated into the analysis. More precisely, by consolidating the right to use patents required for commercialization of a product, private market solutions, such as cross-licensing agreements and patent pools help firms to overcome problems triggered by the intellectual property rights fragmentation. Thereby, private bargaining between parties as such cannot be isolated from the legal framework. A result of this analysis is that policies ignoring market solutions and only focusing on static gains can mitigate the dynamic efficiency gains as induced by the patent system. The evidence found in this thesis supports the opinion that legal reforms that aim to decrease the degree of patent protection or to lift it all together can hamper the functioning of the current system.
Resumo:
The aim of this thesis is to discuss and develop the Unified Patent Court project to account for the role it could play in implementing judicial specialisation in the Intellectual Property field. To provide an original contribution to the existing literature on the topic, this work addresses the issue of how the Unified Patent Court could relate to the other forms of judicial specialisation already operating in the European Union context. This study presents a systematic assessment of the not-yet-operational Unified Patent Court within the EU judicial system, which has recently shown a trend towards being developed outside the institutional framework of the European Union Court of Justice. The objective is to understand to what extent the planned implementation of the Unified Patent Court could succeed in responding to the need for specialisation and in being compliant with the EU legal and constitutional framework. Using the Unified Patent Court as a case study, it is argued that specialised courts in the field of Intellectual Property have a significant role to play in the European judicial system and offer an adequate response to the growing complexity of business operations and relations. The significance of this study is to analyse whether the UPC can still be considered as an appropriate solution to unify the European patent litigation system. The research considers the significant deficiencies, which risks having a negative effect on the European Union institutional procedures. In this perspective, this work aims to make a contribution in identifying the potential negative consequences of this reform. It also focuses on considering different alternatives for a European patent system, which could effectively promote innovation in Europe.
Resumo:
Riconosciuto il problema dell’accesso ai farmaci come un problema di giustizia globale, la dissertazione, da un lato, è incentrata sullo studio dei diritti umani e sul diritto alla salute da una prospettiva giusfilosofica e, dall’altro, è finalizzata ad analizzare la disciplina brevettuale internazionale, sia approfondendo gli interessi realmente in gioco, sia studiando la struttura economica del brevetto stesso. Si è cercato quindi di guardare a tali interessi da una nuova prospettiva, ipotizzando una gerarchia di valori che sia completa e coerente con gli obiettivi che la dottrina, la giurisprudenza, nonché il diritto internazionale formalmente enunciano. Il progetto di ricerca vuole, in definitiva, arrivare a proporre nuove soluzioni giuridiche al problema dell’accesso ai farmaci. La dissertazione svolge pertanto uno studio critico della proposta di Thomas Pogge, di natura politica e giuridica e sorretta da istanze filosofiche, volta alla soluzione del problema dell’accesso ai farmaci, i.e. l’Health Impact Fund (HIF). Proposta che pone radicalmente in discussione, anche concretamente, il dogma del monopolio concesso con la privativa quale ricompensa per i costi di R&D sostenuti dai titolari dei brevetti e che pone, invece, l’accento sull’effettivo impatto sulla salute globale di ogni singola invenzione. Analizzandone approfonditamente gli aspetti più rilevanti, si passano poi in rassegna, criticamente, le proposte, alternative o di riforma, del sistema di proprietà intellettuale, volte al miglioramento dell’accesso ai farmaci; a tal proposito, si propone quindi una riforma transitoria della disciplina brevettuale, c.d. Trading Time for Space (TTS), che prevede un allungamento temporale dell’esclusiva brevettuale (Time) in cambio della vendita da parte del titolare della privativa del farmaco ad un prezzo accessibile nei Paesi in via di sviluppo (Space).
Resumo:
This dissertation looks at three widely accepted assumptions about how the patent system works: patent documents disclose inventions; this disclosure happens quickly, and patent owners are able to enforce patents. The first chapter estimates the effect of stronger trade secret protection on the number of patented innovations. When firms find it easier to protect business information, there is less need for patent protection, and accordingly less need for the disclosure of technical information that is required by patent law. The novel finding is that when it is easier to keep innovations, there is not only a reduction in the number of patents but also a sizeable reduction in disclosed knowledge per patent. The chapter then shows how this endogeneity of the amount of knowledge per patent can affect the measurement of innovation using patent data. The second chapter develops a game-theoretic model to study how the introduction of fee-shifting in US patent litigation would influence firms’ patenting propensities. When the defeated party to a lawsuit has to bear not only their own cost but also the legal expenditure of the winning party, manufacturing firms in the model unambiguously reduce patenting, with small firms affected the most. For fee-shifting to have the same effect as in Europe, the US legal system would require shifting of a much smaller share of fees. Lessons from European patent litigation may, therefore, have only limited applicability in the US case. The third chapter contains a theoretical analysis of the influence of delayed disclosure of patent applications by the patent office. Such a delay is a feature of most patent systems around the world but has so far not attracted analytical scrutiny. This delay may give firms various kinds of strategic (non-)disclosure incentives when they are competing for more than a single innovation.