Law and Science through the Lens of Patent Law and Software Agents

In this investigation I look at patents and software agents as a way to study broader relation between law and science (the latter term broadly understood as inclusive of science and technology). The overall premise framing the entire discussion, my basic thesis, is that this relation, between law and science, cannot be understood without taking into account a number of intervening factors identifying which makes it necessary to approach the question from the standpoint of fields and disciplines other than law and science themselves.

Ex-post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law

This doctoral thesis examines the use of liability rules to protect patent entitlements, focusing on a specific type of rule named ex-post since it is applied and designed ex-post by a court or an agency. The research starts from the premise that patents are defined by the legal and economic scholarship as exclusive rights but nevertheless, under certain circumstances there are economic as well as other compelling reasons to transform the exclusiveness of patent rights into a right to receive compensation.

Essays on Innovative Activity and the Protection of Innovations

This dissertation looks at three widely accepted assumptions about how the patent system works: patent documents disclose inventions; this disclosure happens quickly, and patent owners are able to enforce patents. The first chapter estimates the effect of stronger trade secret protection on the number of patented innovations. When firms find it easier to protect business information, there is less need for patent protection, and accordingly less need for the disclosure of technical information that is required by patent law. The novel finding is that when it is easier to keep innovations, there is not only a reduction in the number of patents but also a sizeable reduction in disclosed knowledge per patent. The chapter then shows how this endogeneity of the amount of knowledge per patent can affect the measurement of innovation using patent data. The second chapter develops a game-theoretic model to study how the introduction of fee-shifting in US patent litigation would influence firms’ patenting propensities. When the defeated party to a lawsuit has to bear not only their own cost but also the legal expenditure of the winning party, manufacturing firms in the model unambiguously reduce patenting, with small firms affected the most. For fee-shifting to have the same effect as in Europe, the US legal system would require shifting of a much smaller share of fees. Lessons from European patent litigation may, therefore, have only limited applicability in the US case. The third chapter contains a theoretical analysis of the influence of delayed disclosure of patent applications by the patent office. Such a delay is a feature of most patent systems around the world but has so far not attracted analytical scrutiny. This delay may give firms various kinds of strategic (non-)disclosure incentives when they are competing for more than a single innovation.

Patent Strategies and R&D in Complex Product Industries

The study aims at providing a framework conceptualizing patenting activities under the condition of intellectual property rights fragmentation. Such a framework has to deal with the interrelated problems of technological complexity in the modern patent landscape. In that respect, ex-post licensing agreements have been incorporated into the analysis. More precisely, by consolidating the right to use patents required for commercialization of a product, private market solutions, such as cross-licensing agreements and patent pools help firms to overcome problems triggered by the intellectual property rights fragmentation. Thereby, private bargaining between parties as such cannot be isolated from the legal framework. A result of this analysis is that policies ignoring market solutions and only focusing on static gains can mitigate the dynamic efficiency gains as induced by the patent system. The evidence found in this thesis supports the opinion that legal reforms that aim to decrease the degree of patent protection or to lift it all together can hamper the functioning of the current system.