Ex-post Liability Rules in Modern Patent Law

This doctoral thesis examines the use of liability rules to protect patent entitlements, focusing on a specific type of rule named ex-post since it is applied and designed ex-post by a court or an agency. The research starts from the premise that patents are defined by the legal and economic scholarship as exclusive rights but nevertheless, under certain circumstances there are economic as well as other compelling reasons to transform the exclusiveness of patent rights into a right to receive compensation.

Law and Science through the Lens of Patent Law and Software Agents

In this investigation I look at patents and software agents as a way to study broader relation between law and science (the latter term broadly understood as inclusive of science and technology). The overall premise framing the entire discussion, my basic thesis, is that this relation, between law and science, cannot be understood without taking into account a number of intervening factors identifying which makes it necessary to approach the question from the standpoint of fields and disciplines other than law and science themselves.

Patent Strategies and R&D in Complex Product Industries

The study aims at providing a framework conceptualizing patenting activities under the condition of intellectual property rights fragmentation. Such a framework has to deal with the interrelated problems of technological complexity in the modern patent landscape. In that respect, ex-post licensing agreements have been incorporated into the analysis. More precisely, by consolidating the right to use patents required for commercialization of a product, private market solutions, such as cross-licensing agreements and patent pools help firms to overcome problems triggered by the intellectual property rights fragmentation. Thereby, private bargaining between parties as such cannot be isolated from the legal framework. A result of this analysis is that policies ignoring market solutions and only focusing on static gains can mitigate the dynamic efficiency gains as induced by the patent system. The evidence found in this thesis supports the opinion that legal reforms that aim to decrease the degree of patent protection or to lift it all together can hamper the functioning of the current system.

Patent nonnuse: are patent pools as possible solution?

Studies have depicted that the rate of unused patents comprises a high portion of patents in North America, Europe and Japan. Particularly, studies have identified a considerable share of strategic patents which are left unused due to pure strategic reasons. While such patents might generate strategic rents to their owner, they may have harmful consequences for the society if by blocking alternative solutions that other inventions provide they hamper the possibility of better solutions. Accordingly, the importance of the issue of nonuse is highlighted within the literature on strategic patenting, IPR policy and innovation economics. Moreover, the current literature has emphasized on the role of patent pools in dealing with potential issues such as excessive transaction cost caused by patent thickets and blocking patents. In fact, patent pools have emerged as policy tools facilitating technology commercialization and alleviating patent litigation among rivals holding overlapping IPRs. In this dissertation I provide a critical literature review on strategic patenting, identify present gaps and discuss some future research paths. Moreover, I investigate the drivers of strategic non-use of patents with particular focus on unused strategic play patents. Finally, I examine if participation intensity in patent pools by pool members explains their willingness to use their non-pooled patents. I also investigate which characteristics of the patent pools are associated to the willingness to use non-pooled patents through pool participation. I show that technological uncertainty and technological complexity are two technology environment factors that drive unused play patents. I also show that pool members participating more intensively in patent pools are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents through pool participation. I further depict that pool licensors are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents by participating in pools with higher level of technological complementarity to their own technology.