Il Pluralismo tra Democrazia ed Autoritarismo: Il Caso Russo

The research explores the mechanisms in the formation and consolidation of a new regime which combines democratic and authoritarian features; it has emerged as result of democratization processes affecting different world areas in recent years. The study analyses a case of great international significance, post-communist Russia: here internal factors strongly prevail in front of the external variables of democratic imitation and contagion, thus showing to what extent Russia differs from other political contexts. The study intends to examine the strategies used by this regime to solve internal conflicts and become stable in spite of the democratizing pressures coming from outside. Indeed, the literature about political transformations has shown the problems in analyzing these polities together with the need to examine their peculiarities more in depth. In this perspective, the first section focuses on the dynamics of State-building in Russia as a fundamental process in tracing the specific characteristics of the current regime: particularly, it is suggested that the State dimension comes out as crucial in determining the level of political and social pluralism accepted in post-Soviet Russia. This argument is worked out in the second section, which analyses the main mechanisms used by the incumbents to limit and control pluralism within the two arenas of political competition and civil society, from where the major threats to the status quo are supposed to come. The main hypothesis is that the leadership interventions in these spheres during the last ten years have shaped a regime which can be characterized as a new type of authoritarianism: with respect to traditional authoritarian forms a certain degree of political contestation is accepted, visible in the presence of a multiparty system, semi-competitive elections and of the several representatives of civil society. Yet, this diversity is curbed basically in two different ways: from one hand the incumbents provide support to political and social actors who sponsor government politics (see the party of power and pro-Kremlin movements). From the other they use some non coercive forms of control and restriction (in legislation, in political elections) against those actors who promote values and priorities opposed to the official ones.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.