Evaluating non-price effects of regulatory and competition enforcement interventions

This thesis provides an ex-post evaluation of the effects of regulatory and competition policy enforcement interventions on non-price dimensions of competition. Chapter 1 examines the effects of a merger between two large Dutch supermarket chains on the variety and composition of product assortment. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the effects of access regulation in fixed telecoms markets on incentives to invest in superior infrastructure technologies. Non-price effects, together with price effects, are crucial to shed light on the extent of competition in a market and assess the effectiveness of regulatory and competition authorities' interventions. When evaluating non-price effects, however, it is harder to draw conclusions on the overall impact on consumers' welfare.

Integrazione di tecnologie non distruttive per la caratterizzazione di rocce ornamentali

ABSTRACT: The dimension stone qualification through the use of non-destructive tests (NDT) is a relevant research topic for the industrial characterisation of finite products, because the competition of low-costs products can be sustained by an offer of highqualification and a top-guarantee products. The synthesis of potentialities offered by the NDT is the qualification and guarantee similar to the well known agro-industrial PDO, Protected Denomination of Origin. In fact it is possible to guarantee both, the origin and the quality of each stone product element, even through a Factory Production Control on line. A specific disciplinary is needed. A research developed at DICMA-Univ. Bologna in the frame of the “OSMATER” INTERREG project, allowed identifying good correlations between destructive and non-destructive tests for some types of materials from Verbano-Cusio-Ossola region. For example non conventional ultrasonic tests, image analysis parameters, water absorption and other measurements showed to be well correlated with the bending resistance, by relationships varying for each product. In conclusion it has been demonstrated that a nondestructive approach allows reaching several goals, among the most important: 1) the identification of materials; 2) the selection of products; 3) the substitution of DT by NDT. Now it is necessary to move from a research phase to the industrial implementation, as well as to develop new ND technologies focused on specific aims.

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

Clinicopathologic findings in thoroughbred horses during a high speed – short term competition

The aim of this study was to examine whether a real high speed-short term competition influences clinicopathological data focusing on muscle enzymes, iron profile and Acute Phase Proteins. 30 Thoroughbred racing horses (15 geldings and 15 females) aged between 4-12 years (mean 7 years), were used for the study. All the animals performed a high speed-short term competition for a total distance of 154 m in about 12 seconds, repeated 8 times, within approximately one hour (Niballo Horse Race). Blood samples were obtained 24 hours before and within 30 minutes after the end of the races. On all samples were performed a complete blood count (CBC), biochemical and haemostatic profiles. The post-race concentrations for the single parameter were corrected using an estimation of the plasma volume contraction according to the individual Alb concentration. Data were analysed with descriptive statistics and the percentage of variation from the baseline values were recorded. Pre- and post-race results were compared with non-parametric statistics (Mann Whitney U test). A difference was considered significant at p<0.05. A significant plasma volume contraction after the race was detected (Hct, Alb; p<0.01). Other relevant findings were increased concentrations of muscular enzymes (CK, LDH; p<0.01), Crt (p<0.01), significant increased uric acid (p<0.01), a significant decrease of haptoglobin (p<0.01) associated to an increase of ferritin concentrations (p<0.01), significant decrease of fibrinogen (p<0.05) accompanied by a non-significant increase of D-Dimers concentrations (p=0.08). This competition produced relevant abnormalities on clinical pathology in galloping horses. This study confirms a significant muscular damage, oxidative stress, intravascular haemolysis and subclinical hemostatic alterations. Further studies are needed to better understand the pathogenesis, the medical relevance and the impact on performance of these alterations in equine sport medicine.

Data, Competition, and Consumer Privacy in Digital Markets

In digital markets personal information is pervasively collected by firms. In the first chapter I study data ownership and product customization when there is exclusive access to non rival but excludable data about consumer preferences. I show that an incumbent firm does not have an incentive to sell an exclusively held dataset with a rival firm, but instead it has an incentive to trade a customizing technology with the other firm. In the second chapter I investigate the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional model of product differentiation, firms use information on preferences to practice price discrimination. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with a regime in which firms are able to target consumers only partially. When data is partially informative, firms are always better-off with price discrimination and an exclusive access to user data is not necessarily a competition policy concern. From a consumer protection perspective, the policy recommendation is that the regulator should promote either no privacy or full privacy. In the third chapter I introduce a data broker that observes either only one or both dimensions of consumer information and sells this data to competing firms for price discrimination purposes. When the seller exogenously holds a partially informative dataset, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when the dataset held is fully informative, the data broker trades information non exclusively but each competitor acquires consumer data on a different dimension. When data collection is made endogenous, non exclusivity is robust if collection costs are not too high. The competition policy suggestion is that exclusivity should not be banned per se, but it is data differentiation in equilibrium that rises market power in competitive markets. Upstream competition is sufficient to ensure that both firms get access to consumer information.