R-loops and G4-structures: from DNA damage to innate immune response gene activation

Non-B DNA structures like R-loops and G-quadruplexes play a pivotal role in several cellular vital processes like DNA transcription regulation. Misregulation of said non-canonical DNA structures can often lead to genome instability, DNA damage, and, eventually, to the activation of an innate immune response. For such reasons they have been studied as adjuvants in anticancer therapies. Here we studied drugs targeting R-loops (Top1 poisons) and G4s (hydrazone derivatives) in order to observe their effects in terms of DNA damage induction and, subsequently, activation of innate immune response. We studied how non-cytotoxic doses of ampthotecin and LMP-776 impact on genome instability, are capable to induce DNA damage and micronuclei, and, eventually lead to an innate immune gene response via the cGAS/STING pathway. G-quadruplexes are another ubiquitous, non-canonical DNA structure, more abundant in telomeric regions, demonstrating a marked relation with the impairment of telomerase and the regulation of DNA replication and transcription. Furthermore, we investigated the properties of new-synthesized molecules belonging to the highly promising class of hydrazone derivatives, in terms of cytotoxicity, ability to stabilize G4-structures, induce DNA damage, and activate interferon-B production. Both Top1 poisons and G4-stabilizers possess several features that can be very useful in clinical applications, in light of their ability to stimulate innate immune response factors and exert a certain cell-killing power, plus they offer a broad and diverse range of treatment options in order to face a variety of patient treatment needs. It is for these very reasons that it is of uttermost importance that further studies are conducted on these compounds, in order to synthesize new and increasingly powerful and flexible ones, with fewer side effects to customize therapies on specific cancers’ and patients’ features.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

La molecola IRTA1 (immunoglobulin superfamily receptor trans location associated 1) risulta selettivamente espressa nei linfomi non Hodgkin B della zona marginale

La diagnosi di linfoma non Hodgkin B della zona marginale si basa su criteri morfologici e sulla sostanziale negatività per marcatori immunoistochimici espressi in altri sottotipi di linfoma B. L’ obiettivo di questo lavoro è stato, quindi, quello di ricercare una molecola specifica associata ai linfomi della zona marginale. Materiali e Metodi. Sono stati esaminati 2.104 linfomi periferici di entità nosologia eterogenea mediante un anticorpo monoclonale, diretto contro la molecola IRTA1, che riconosce la zona marginale nei tessuti linfoidi umani. Risultati. Si è riscontrata espressione di IRTA1 nel 93% dei linfomi della zona marginale ad insorgenza extranodale e nel 74% di quelli primitivi linfonodali suggerendo la possibilità che questi linfomi possano originare dalle cellule perifollicolari o monocitoidi IRTA1+ riscontrabili nei linfonodi reattivi. La valutazione immunoistochimica mediante doppia colorazione (IRTA1/bcl6), ha inoltre dimostrato come vi sia una modulazione fenotipica nelle cellule marginali neoplastiche nel momento in cui esse colonizzano i follicoli linfoidi e durante la loro circolazione nei centri germinativi. Le cellule marginali neoplastiche che differenziano in senso plasmacellulare perdono l’ espressione di IRTA1 Discussione. In conclusione, tali evidenze hanno permesso di ampliare la conoscenza sulla biologia dei linfomi marginali e sottolineano come IRTA1 sia il primo marcatore diagnostico positivo per queste neoplasie.