The Making of a Shiite Bourgeoisie in Lebanon Political Mobilisation, Economic Resources and Formation of a Social Group

The thesis analyses the making of the Shiite middle- and upper/entrepreneurial-class in Lebanon from the 1960s till the present day. The trajectory explores the historical, political and social (internal and external) factors that brought a sub-proletariat to mobilise and become an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in the span of less than three generations. This work proposes the main theoretical hypothesis to unpack and reveal the trajectory of a very recent social class that through education, diaspora, political and social mobilisation evolved in a few years into a very peculiar bourgeoisie: whereas Christian-Maronite middle class practically produced political formations and benefited from them and from Maronite’s state supremacy (National Pact, 1943) reinforcing the community’s status quo, Shiites built their own bourgeoisie from within, and mobilised their “cadres” (Boltanski) not just to benefit from their renovated presence at the state level, but to oppose to it. The general Social Movement Theory (SMT), as well as a vast amount of the literature on (middle) class formation are therefore largely contradicted, opening up new territories for discussion on how to build a bourgeoisie without the state’s support (Social Mobilisation Theory, Resource Mobilisation Theory) and if, eventually, the middle class always produces democratic movements (the emergence of a social group out of backwardness and isolation into near dominance of a political order). The middle/upper class described here is at once an economic class related to the control of multiple forms of capital, and produced by local, national, and transnational networks related to flows of services, money, and education, and a culturally constructed social location and identity structured by economic as well as other forms of capital in relation to other groups in Lebanon.

Finanza Imprenditoriale: Teoria del Portafoglio e Costo del Capitale

This thesis focuses on the limits that may prevent an entrepreneur from maximizing her value, and the benefits of diversification in reducing her cost of capital. After reviewing all relevant literature dealing with the differences between traditional corporate finance and entrepreneurial finance, we focus on the biases occurring when traditional finance techniques are applied to the entrepreneurial context. In particular, using the portfolio theory framework, we determine the degree of under-diversification of entrepreneurs. Borrowing the methodology developed by Kerins et al. (2004), we test a model for the cost of capital according to the firms' industry and the entrepreneur's wealth commitment to the firm. This model takes three market inputs (standard deviation of market returns, expected return of the market, and risk-free rate), and two firm-specific inputs (standard deviation of the firm returns and correlation between firm and market returns) as parameters, and returns an appropriate cost of capital as an output. We determine the expected market return and the risk-free rate according to the huge literature on the market risk premium. As for the market return volatility, it is estimated considering a GARCH specification for the market index returns. Furthermore, we assume that the firm-specific inputs can be obtained considering new-listed firms similar in risk to the firm we are evaluating. After we form a database including all the data needed for our analysis, we perform an empirical investigation to understand how much of the firm's total risk depends on market risk, and which explanatory variables can explain it. Our results show that cost of capital declines as the level of entrepreneur's commitment decreases. Therefore, maximizing the value for the entrepreneur depends on the fraction of entrepreneur's wealth invested in the firm and the fraction she sells to outside investors. These results are interesting both for entrepreneurs and policy makers: the former can benefit from an unbiased model for their valuation; the latter can obtain some guidelines to overcome the recent financial market crisis.

Il conflitto fra trasparenza sui mercati finanziari ed esigenza di riservatezza della società

The thesis main topic is the conflict between disclosure in financial markets and the need for confidentiality of the firm. After a recognition of the major dynamics of information production and dissemination in the stock market, the analysis moves to the interactions between the information that a firm is tipically interested in keeping confidential, such as trade secrets or the data usually covered by patent protection, and the countervailing demand for disclosure arising from finacial markets. The analysis demonstrates that despite the seeming divergence between informational contents tipically disclosed to investors and information usually covered by intellectual property protection, the overlapping areas are nonetheless wide and the conflict between transparency in financial markets and the firm’s need for confidentiality arises frequently and sistematically. Indeed, the company’s disclosure policy is based on a continuous trade-off between the costs and the benefits related to the public dissemination of information. Such costs are mainly represented by the competitive harm caused by competitors’ access to sensitive data, while the benefits mainly refer to the lower cost of capital that the firm obtains as a consequence of more disclosure. Secrecy shields the value of costly produced information against third parties’ free riding and constitutes therefore a means to protect the firm’s incentives toward the production of new information and especially toward technological and business innovation. Excessively demanding standards of transparency in financial markets might hinder such set of incentives and thus jeopardize the dynamics of innovation production. Within Italian securities regulation, there are two sets of rules mostly relevant with respect to such an issue: the first one is the rule that mandates issuers to promptly disclose all price-sensitive information to the market on an ongoing basis; the second one is the duty to disclose in the prospectus all the information “necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment” of the issuers’ financial and economic perspectives. Both rules impose high disclosure standards and have potentially unlimited scope. Yet, they have safe harbours aimed at protecting the issuer need for confidentiality. Despite the structural incompatibility between public dissemination of information and the firm’s need to keep certain data confidential, there are certain ways to convey information to the market while preserving at the same time the firm’s need for confidentality. Such means are insider trading and selective disclosure: both are based on mechanics whereby the process of price reaction to the new information takes place without any corresponding activity of public release of data. Therefore, they offer a solution to the conflict between disclosure and the need for confidentiality that enhances market efficiency and preserves at the same time the private set of incentives toward innovation.