Innovative architecture of on-board and on-ground radio systems for space communication

The radio communication system is one of the most critical system of the overall satellite platform: it often represents the only way of communication, between a spacecraft and the Ground Segment or among a constellation of satellites. This thesis focuses on specific innovative architectures for on-board and on-ground radio systems. In particular, this work is an integral part of a space program started in 2004 at the University of Bologna, Forlì campus, which led to the completion of the microsatellite ALMASat-1, successfully launched on-board the VEGA maiden flight. The success of this program led to the development of a second microsatellite, named ALMASat-EO, a three-axis stabilized microsatellite able to capture images of the Earth surface. Therefore, the first objective of this study was focused on the investigation of an innovative, efficient and low cost architecture for on-board radio communication systems. The TT&C system and the high data rate transmitter for images downlink design and realization are thoroughly described in this work, together with the development of the embedded hardware and the adopted antenna systems. Moreover, considering the increasing interest in the development of constellations of microsatellite, in particular those flying in close formations, a careful analysis has been carried out for the development of innovative communication protocols for inter-satellite links. Furthermore, in order to investigate the system aspects of space communications, a study has been carried out at ESOC having as objective the design, implementation and test of two experimental devices for the enhancement of the ESA GS. Thus, a significant portion of this thesis is dedicated to the description of the results of a method for improving the phase stability of GS radio frequency equipments by means of real-time phase compensation and a new way to perform two antennas arraying tracking using already existing ESA tracking stations facilities.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.