Specification, execution and verification of interaction protocols: an approach based on computational logic

Interaction protocols establish how different computational entities can interact with each other. The interaction can be finalized to the exchange of data, as in 'communication protocols', or can be oriented to achieve some result, as in 'application protocols'. Moreover, with the increasing complexity of modern distributed systems, protocols are used also to control such a complexity, and to ensure that the system as a whole evolves with certain features. However, the extensive use of protocols has raised some issues, from the language for specifying them to the several verification aspects. Computational Logic provides models, languages and tools that can be effectively adopted to address such issues: its declarative nature can be exploited for a protocol specification language, while its operational counterpart can be used to reason upon such specifications. In this thesis we propose a proof-theoretic framework, called SCIFF, together with its extensions. SCIFF is based on Abductive Logic Programming, and provides a formal specification language with a clear declarative semantics (based on abduction). The operational counterpart is given by a proof procedure, that allows to reason upon the specifications and to test the conformance of given interactions w.r.t. a defined protocol. Moreover, by suitably adapting the SCIFF Framework, we propose solutions for addressing (1) the protocol properties verification (g-SCIFF Framework), and (2) the a-priori conformance verification of peers w.r.t. the given protocol (AlLoWS Framework). We introduce also an agent based architecture, the SCIFF Agent Platform, where the same protocol specification can be used to program and to ease the implementation task of the interacting peers.

The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?