Functional and neural mechanisms of intertemporal choice

People are daily faced with intertemporal choice, i.e., choices differing in the timing of their consequences, frequently preferring smaller-sooner rewards over larger-delayed ones, reflecting temporal discounting of the value of future outcomes. This dissertation addresses two main goals. New evidence about the neural bases of intertemporal choice is provided. Following the disruption of either the medial orbitofrontal cortex or the insula, the willingness to wait for larger-delayed outcomes is affected in odd directions, suggesting the causal involvement of these areas in regulating the value computation of rewards available with different timings. These findings were also supported by a reported imaging study. Moreover, this dissertation provides new evidence about how temporal discounting can be modulated at a behavioral level through different manipulations, e.g., allowing individuals to think about the distant time, pairing rewards with aversive events, or changing their perceived spatial position. A relationship between intertemporal choice, moral judgements and aging is also discussed. All these findings link together to support a unitary neural model of temporal discounting according to which signals coming from several cortical (i.e., medial orbitofrontal cortex, insula) and subcortical regions (i.e., amygdala, ventral striatum) are integrated to represent the subjective value of both earlier and later rewards, under the top-down regulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The present findings also support the idea that the process of outcome evaluation is strictly related to the ability to pre-experience and envision future events through self-projection, the anticipation of visceral feelings associated with receiving rewards, and the psychological distance from rewards. Furthermore, taking into account the emotions and the state of arousal at the time of decision seems necessary to understand impulsivity associated with preferring smaller-sooner goods in place of larger-later goods.

Fresh Produce Safety and Good Agricultural Practices: Stakeholders' Perception and Consumers' Choice in Thailand

Concerns of Thai consumers on food safety have been recently increasing, especially in urban areas and for fresh produce because food safety scandals, such as chemical residues on fresh produce (e.g., cabbage) still frequently occur. The Thai government tried to meet consumer needs by imposing in the domestic market a stronger regulation aimed at increasing the baseline level of food safety assurance and by introducing a voluntary standard (based on Good Agricultural Practices or GAPs and known as Q-GAP) and the related food safety label (i.e., Q mark). However, since standards and regulations are weakly implemented in the domestic market compared to exported products, there is still a lack of Thai consumers’ confidence in the safety of local food products. In this work the current situation of GAPs adoption in Thai fresh produce production is analysed. Furthermore, it is studied whether Thai consumers place value on food safety labels available on the market, to know whether consumer demand could drive the market of certified safer products. This study contains three essays: 1) a review of the literature, 2) a qualitative study on stakeholders' perception toward GAPs adoption and 3) a quantitative study, aimed at analysing consumers' preferences and willingness-to-pay for food safety labels on fresh produce using a discrete choice experiment. This dissertation contributes to the economics of quality assurance and labelling, specifically addressing GAPs and food safety label in the fresh produce supply chain. Results show that Q-GAP could be effectively used to improve food safety in Thai domestic market, but its credibility should be improved. Stakeholder’s awareness toward food safety issues and the delivery of reliable and sound information are crucial. Thai consumers are willing to pay a premium price for food safety labelled produce over unlabelled ones. Implications for both government and business decision-makers are discussed.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.