Banking Regulation in Turkey and Russia: An Economic Analysis

The importance of the banks and financial markets relies on the fact that they promote economic efficiency by allocating savings efficiently to profitable investment opportunities.An efficient banking system is a key determinant for the financial stability.The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial regulation.Following the detrimental economic and financial consequences in theaftermath of the crisis, academics and policymakers started to focus their attention on the construction of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector. This dissertation aims at understanding the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ performance focusing on two emerging market economies, Turkey and Russia. It aims at examining the way in which regulations matter for financial stability and banking performance from a law & economics perspective. A review of the theory of banking regulation, particularly as applied to emerging economies, shows that the efficiency of certain solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. Therefore, in the context of emerging countries, whether a certain approach is efficient or not will be presented as an empirical question to which this dissertation will try to find an answer.

The Law and Economics of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparison between the U.S. and the EU

This doctoral dissertation seeks to assess and address the potential contribution of the hedge fund industry to financial instability. In so doing, the dissertation investigates three main questions. What are the contributions of hedge funds to financial instability? What is the optimal regulatory strategy to address the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability? And do new regulations in the U.S. and the EU address the contribution of hedge funds to financial instability? With respect to financial stability concerns, it is argued that despite their benefits, hedge funds can contribute to financial instability. Hedge funds’ size and leverage, their interconnectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), and the likelihood of herding behavior in the industry can potentially undermine financial stability. Nonetheless, the data on hedge funds’ size and leverage suggest that these features are far from being systemically important. In contrast, the empirical evidence on the interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs and their herding behavior is mixed. Based on these findings, the thesis focuses on one particular aspect of hedge fund regulation: direct vs. indirect regulation. In this respect, a major contribution of the thesis to the literature consists in the explicit discussion of the relationships between hedge funds and other market participants. Specifically, the thesis locates the domain of the indirect regulation in the inter-linkages between hedge funds and prime brokers. Accordingly, the thesis argues that the indirect regulation is likely to address the contribution of hedge funds to systemic risk without compromising their benefits to financial markets. The thesis further conducts a comparative study of the regulatory responses to the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability through studying the EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) and the hedge fund-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.

Abusing data dominance in the digital market. The application of merger control and article 102 TFEU to data-related conducts.

The internet and digital technologies revolutionized the economy. Regulating the digital market has become a priority for the European Union. While promoting innovation and development, EU institutions must assure that the digital market maintains a competitive structure. Among the numerous elements characterizing the digital sector, users’ data are particularly important. Digital services are centered around personal data, the accumulation of which contributed to the centralization of market power in the hands of a few large providers. As a result, data-driven mergers and data-related abuses gained a central role for the purposes of EU antitrust enforcement. In light of these considerations, this work aims at assessing whether EU competition law is well-suited to address data-driven mergers and data-related abuses of dominance. These conducts are of crucial importance to the maintenance of competition in the digital sector, insofar as the accumulation of users’ data constitutes a fundamental competitive advantage. To begin with, part 1 addresses the specific features of the digital market and their impact on the definition of the relevant market and the assessment of dominance by antitrust authorities. Secondly, part 2 analyzes the EU’s case law on data-driven mergers to verify if merger control is well-suited to address these concentrations. Thirdly, part 3 discusses abuses of dominance in the phase of data collection and the legal frameworks applicable to these conducts. Fourthly, part 4 focuses on access to “essential” datasets and the indirect effects of anticompetitive conducts on rivals’ ability to access users’ information. Finally, Part 5 discusses differential pricing practices implemented online and based on personal data. As it will be assessed, the combination of an efficient competition law enforcement and the auspicial adoption of a specific regulation seems to be the best solution to face the challenges raised by “data-related dominance”.