The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.

Sanctions and public enforcement of insider trading laws in Europe

The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.

I mercati di crescita per le PMI

La tesi studia ed approfondisce la disciplina dei mercati di crescita per le PMI, indagando il regime normativo delle società ivi quotate. Considerata la struttura composita dell’architettura regolamentare (direttive e regolamenti europei, fonti primarie nazionali e regolamento del mercato) l’indagine adotta una prospettiva olistica sulla regolamentazione, al fine di individuare principii comuni e risolevere dubbi interpretativi. Inoltre, l’approfondimento in chiave storica e di economia politica, volto a ricostruire le ragioni per l’introduzione dei mercati di crescita e gli obiettivi perseguiti dal legislatore europeo, permette di identificare le rationes sottostanti alle disposizioni e di facilitarne l’interpretazione. Il primo capitolo approfondisce l’evoluzione storica e istituzionale dei mercati di crescita per le PMI e gli obiettivi che il legislatore europeo si prefigge di raggiungere. Il secondo capitolo affronta invece il processo di registrazione dei sistemi multilaterali di negoziazione come mercati di crescita. Il capitolo indaga quali siano i requisiti affinché un sistema multilaterale possa essere registrato come mercato di crescita, come si svolga il processo di registrazione e quale sia il ruolo dell’autorità di vigilanza. Il terzo capitolo approfondisce quali siano le disposizioni di diritto societario applicabili agli emittenti quotati sui mercati di crescita. Infatti, mentre la disciplina per gli emittenti quotati sui mercati regolamentati non è direttamente applicabile a queste società, non si può neppure escludere in via preliminare che determinate disposizioni non siano applicabili in via analogica, a causa delle specifiche caratteristiche conferite a questi emittenti ed ai titoli ammessi alla negoziazione dalla quotazione. Il quarto capitolo analizza diverse disposizioni relative all’informazione, intesa in senso ampio. Infine, il quinto capitolo affronta la disciplina dell’o.p.a. obbligatoria prevista dal regolamento del mercato di crescita AIM Italia.

The abuse of intellectual property rights and regulations in China: a law and economic analysis

From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School’s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, “instant scalability”, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR “will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.”1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories’ perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!

Study of the urinary biomarkers of synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs) for the forensic unequivocal proof of consumption: medico-legal implications for drug abuse prevention

Introduction. Synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs) represent the widest group of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) and, around 2021-2022, new compounds emerged on the market. The aims of the present research were to identify suitable urinary markers of Cumyl-CB-MEGACLONE, Cumyl-NB-MEGACLONE, Cumyl-NB-MINACA, 5F-EDMB-PICA, EDMB-PINACA and ADB-HEXINACA, to present data on their prevalence and to adapt the methodology from the University of Freiburg to the University of Bologna. Materials and methods. Human phase-I metabolites detected in 46 authentic urine samples were confirmed in vitro with pooled human liver microsomes (pHLM) assays, analyzed by liquid chromatography-quadrupole time-of-flight mass spectrometry (LC-qToF-MS). Prevalence data were obtained from urines collected for abstinence control programs. The method to study SCRAs metabolism in use at the University of Freiburg was adapted to the local facilities, tested in vitro with 5F-EDMB-PICA and applied to the study of ADB-HEXINACA metabolism. Results. Metabolites built by mono, di- and tri-hydroxylation were recommended as specific urinary biomarkers to monitor the consumption of SCRAs bearing a cumyl moiety. Monohydroxylated and defluorinated metabolites were suitable proof of 5F-EDMB-PICA consumption. Products of monohydroxylation and amide or ester hydrolysis, coupled to monohydroxylation or ketone formation, were recognized as specific markers for EDMB-PINACA and ADB-HEXINACA. The LC-qToF-MS method was successfully adapted to the University of Bologna, as tested with 5F-EDMB-PICA in vitro metabolites. Prevalence data showed that 5F-EDMB-PINACA and EDMB-PINACA were more prevalent than ADB-HEXINACA, but for a limited period. Conclusion. Due to undetectability of parent compounds in urines and to shared metabolites among structurally related compounds, the identification of specific urinary biomarkers as unequivocal proofs of SCRAs consumption remains challenging for forensic laboratories. Urinary biomarkers are necessary to monitor SCRAs abuse and prevalence data could help in establishing tailored strategies to prevent their spreading, highlighting the role for legal medicine as a service to public health.