La renuncia al ejercicio de la acción social de responsabilidad

En el presente estudio se aborda un tema, el del régimen jurídico de la renuncia a la acción social de responsabilidad, que ha sido objeto de un escaso tratamiento por parte de la doctrina española. Estamos ante una institución controvertida, que regula la posibilidad de que una sociedad de capital abandone voluntariamente las pretensiones indemnizatorias que pudiera ostentar frente a alguno de sus administradores por los daños que éstos hubieran ocasionado en el patrimonio social como consecuencia del incumplimiento sus deberes de diligencia y lealtad. El hecho de que una sociedad de capital pueda acordar esta renuncia es un claro indicio del carácter dispositivo de las normas que regulan la responsabilidad de los administradores frente a la sociedad. Después de abordar de los antecedentes y evolución histórica de la renuncia a la acción social, la primera parte del estudio se centra en el análisis del ámbito material y temporal de su régimen jurídico, concluyendo que éste regula no sólo la renuncia o la transacción procesal, sino que se aplica cualquier acuerdo de la junta general que tenga como efecto una exoneración total o parcial de los administradores. La segunda parte del estudio profundiza en el régimen jurídico de la renuncia, haciendo hincapié en el derecho de veto que la Ley española y el Codice civile reconocen a la minoría y que se configura como una auténtica excepción al principio mayoritario que rige, con carácter general, la formación de la voluntad social. En el último capítulo se analizan los efectos de la renuncia acordada por la junta sobre la legitimación extraordinaria que ostentan los socios minoritarios y los acreedores sociales para el ejercicio de la acción social.

Monitoring Complex Processes to Verify System Conformance: A Declarative Rule-Based Framework

Over the last 60 years, computers and software have favoured incredible advancements in every field. Nowadays, however, these systems are so complicated that it is difficult – if not challenging – to understand whether they meet some requirement or are able to show some desired behaviour or property. This dissertation introduces a Just-In-Time (JIT) a posteriori approach to perform the conformance check to identify any deviation from the desired behaviour as soon as possible, and possibly apply some corrections. The declarative framework that implements our approach – entirely developed on the promising open source forward-chaining Production Rule System (PRS) named Drools – consists of three components: 1. a monitoring module based on a novel, efficient implementation of Event Calculus (EC), 2. a general purpose hybrid reasoning module (the first of its genre) merging temporal, semantic, fuzzy and rule-based reasoning, 3. a logic formalism based on the concept of expectations introducing Event-Condition-Expectation rules (ECE-rules) to assess the global conformance of a system. The framework is also accompanied by an optional module that provides Probabilistic Inductive Logic Programming (PILP). By shifting the conformance check from after execution to just in time, this approach combines the advantages of many a posteriori and a priori methods proposed in literature. Quite remarkably, if the corrective actions are explicitly given, the reactive nature of this methodology allows to reconcile any deviations from the desired behaviour as soon as it is detected. In conclusion, the proposed methodology brings some advancements to solve the problem of the conformance checking, helping to fill the gap between humans and the increasingly complex technology.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.