The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.