9 resultados para Law Enforcement
em AMS Tesi di Dottorato - Alm@DL - Università di Bologna
Resumo:
Come risposta positiva alle richieste provenienti dal mondo dei giuristi, spesso troppo distante da quello scientifico, si vuole sviluppare un sistema solido dal punto di vista tecnico e chiaro dal punto di vista giurico finalizzato ad migliore ricerca della verità. L’obiettivo ci si prefigge è quello di creare uno strumento versatile e di facile utilizzo da mettere a disposizione dell’A.G. ed eventualmente della P.G. operante finalizzato a consentire il proseguo dell’attività d’indagine in tempi molto rapidi e con un notevole contenimento dei costi di giustizia rispetto ad una normale CTU. La progetto verterà su analisi informatiche forensi di supporti digitali inerenti vari tipi di procedimento per cui si dovrebbe richiedere una CTU o una perizia. La sperimentazione scientifica prevede un sistema di partecipazione diretta della P.G. e della A.G. all’analisi informatica rendendo disponibile, sottoforma di macchina virtuale, il contenuto dei supporti sequestrati in modo che possa essere visionato alla pari del supporto originale. In questo modo il CT diventa una mera guida per la PG e l’AG nell’ambito dell’indagine informatica forense che accompagna il giudice e le parti alla migliore comprensione delle informazioni richieste dal quesito. Le fasi chiave della sperimentazione sono: • la ripetibilità delle operazioni svolte • dettare delle chiare linee guida per la catena di custodia dalla presa in carico dei supporti • i metodi di conservazione e trasmissione dei dati tali da poter garantire integrità e riservatezza degli stessi • tempi e costi ridotti rispetto alle normali CTU/perizie • visualizzazione diretta dei contenuti dei supporti analizzati delle Parti e del Giudice circoscritte alle informazioni utili ai fini di giustizia
Resumo:
L’oggetto del lavoro si concentra sull’analisi in chiave giuridica del modello di cooperazione in rete tra le autorità nazionali degli Stati membri nel quadro dello Spazio LSG, allo scopo di valutarne il contributo, le prospettive e il potenziale. La trattazione si suddivide in due parti, precedute da una breve premessa teorica incentrata sull’analisi della nozione di rete e la sua valenza giuridica. La prima parte ricostruisce il percorso di maturazione della cooperazione in rete, dando risalto tanto ai fattori di ordine congiunturale quanto ai fattori giuridici e d’ordine strutturale che sono alla base del processo di retificazione dei settori giustizia e sicurezza. In particolare, vengono elaborati taluni rilievi critici, concernenti l’operatività degli strumenti giuridici che attuano il principio di mutuo riconoscimento e di quelli che danno applicazione al principio di disponibilità delle informazioni. Ciò allo scopo di evidenziare gli ostacoli che, di frequente, impediscono il buon esito delle procedure di cooperazione e di comprendere le potenzialità e le criticità derivanti dall’utilizzo della rete rispetto alla concreta applicazione di tali procedure. La seconda parte si focalizza sull’analisi delle principali reti attive in materia di giustizia e sicurezza, con particolare attenzione ai rispettivi meccanismi di funzionamento. La trattazione si suddivide in due distinte sezioni che si concentrano sulle a) reti che operano a supporto dell’applicazione delle procedure di assistenza giudiziaria e degli strumenti di mutuo riconoscimento e sulle b) reti che operano nel settore della cooperazione informativa e agevolano lo scambio di informazioni operative e tecniche nelle azioni di prevenzione e lotta alla criminalità - specialmente nel settore della protezione dell’economia lecita. La trattazione si conclude con la ricostruzione delle caratteristiche di un modello di rete europea e del ruolo che questo esercita rispetto all’esercizio delle competenze dell’Unione Europea in materia di giustizia e sicurezza.
Resumo:
Gli ultimi anni hanno visto importanti cambiamenti positivi nella cooperazione interstatale in Asia centrale. Crescenti minacce come il terrorismo internazionale, l'estremismo religioso e politico, il traffico di droga, ecc, causati dagli interessi geopolitici e geo-economici delle potenze mondiali, hanno contribuito alla formazione di una politica estera più coordinata e coerente degli Stati della regione. Questo processo si manifesta nella partecipazione attiva dell’istituzionalizzazione della Shanghai Organizzazione del Commonwealth (SOC), Conferenza sulle misure di costruzione d’interazione e fiducia in Asia (CICA) e Organizzazione del Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva (CSTO). Problemi moderni di sicurezza in Asia centrale dovrebbero essere risolti in dei nuovi modi, non convenzionali. Le nuove minacce alla sicurezza richiedono modi non standard per risolvere il problema. Considerate le differenze fondamentali dell'Unione europea e degli Stati dell'Asia centrale nei valori e dal punto di vista in materia di sicurezza. I paesi dell'Asia centrale non sono pronti per l'integrazione politica. Nonostante questo, nell’Asia centrale sono state adottate misure per contrastare le minacce non convenzionali. L’esperienza europea di unire gli sforzi della regione per garantire la sicurezza interna, può essere utilizzata dai paesi dell'Asia centrale, soprattutto, in primo luogo sulla formazione del quadro istituzionale e giuridico per la cooperazione operativa delle forze dell'ordine per le seguenti aree: • prevenzione del traffico di droga attraverso gli Stati dell'Asia centrale; • lotta contro nuove forme di terrorismo ed estremismo; • limitare la dimensione della migrazione clandestina; • migliorare la protezione giuridica dei cittadini. Fino a poco tempo fa, questi temi hanno ricevuto poca attenzione, sia nella teoria sia nella pratica, poiché i problemi di sicurezza della società erano principalmente ridotti per evitare il pericolo di guerra.
Resumo:
One of the ways by which the legal system has responded to different sets of problems is the blurring of the traditional boundaries of criminal law, both procedural and substantive. This study aims to explore under what conditions does this trend lead to the improvement of society's welfare by focusing on two distinguishing sanctions in criminal law, incarceration and social stigma. In analyzing how incarceration affects the incentive to an individual to violate a legal standard, we considered the crucial role of the time constraint. This aspect has not been fully explored in the literature on law and economics, especially with respect to the analysis of the beneficiality of imposing either a fine or a prison term. We observed that that when individuals are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and wage income, and when the level of activity can be considered a normal good, only the middle wage and middle income groups can be adequately deterred by a fixed fines alone regime. The existing literature only considers the case of the very poor, deemed as judgment proof. However, since imprisonment is a socially costly way to deprive individuals of their time, other alternatives may be sought such as the imposition of discriminatory monetary fine, partial incapacitation and other alternative sanctions. According to traditional legal theory, the reason why criminal law is obeyed is not mainly due to the monetary sanctions but to the stigma arising from the community’s moral condemnation that accompanies conviction or merely suspicion. However, it is not sufficiently clear whether social stigma always accompanies a criminal conviction. We addressed this issue by identifying the circumstances wherein a criminal conviction carries an additional social stigma. Our results show that social stigma is seen to accompany a conviction under the following conditions: first, when the law coincides with the society's social norms; and second, when the prohibited act provides information on an unobservable attribute or trait of an individual -- crucial in establishing or maintaining social relationships beyond mere economic relationships. Thus, even if the social planner does not impose the social sanction directly, the impact of social stigma can still be influenced by the probability of conviction and the level of the monetary fine imposed as well as the varying degree of correlation between the legal standard violated and the social traits or attributes of the individual. In this respect, criminal law serves as an institution that facilitates cognitive efficiency in the process of imposing the social sanction to the extent that the rest of society is boundedly rational and use judgment heuristics. Paradoxically, using criminal law in order to invoke stigma for the violation of a legal standard may also serve to undermine its strength. To sum, the results of our analysis reveal that the scope of criminal law is narrow both for the purposes of deterrence and cognitive efficiency. While there are certain conditions where the enforcement of criminal law may lead to an increase in social welfare, particularly with respect to incarceration and stigma, we have also identified the channels through which they could affect behavior. Since such mechanisms can be replicated in less costly ways, society should first try or seek to employ these legal institutions before turning to criminal law as a last resort.
Resumo:
This book is dedicated to the Law and Economics analysis of civil liability of securities underwriters for the damage caused by material misstatements of corporate information by securities issuers. It seeks to answer a series of important questions. Who the are underwriters and what is their main role in the securities offering? Why there is a need for legal intervention in the underwriting market? What is so special about civil liability as an enforcement tool? How is civil liability used in a real world and does it really reach its goals? Finally, is there a need for a change and, if so, by what means?
Resumo:
This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.
Resumo:
The recent financial crisis triggered an increasing demand for financial regulation to counteract the potential negative economic effects of the evermore complex operations and instruments available on financial markets. As a result, insider trading regulation counts amongst the relatively recent but particularly active regulation battles in Europe and overseas. Claims for more transparency and equitable securities markets proliferate, ranging from concerns about investor protection to global market stability. The internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged traditional notions of regulation and enforcement. Considering that insider trading is currently forbidden all over Europe, this study follows a law and economics approach in identifying how this prohibition should be enforced. More precisely, the study investigates first whether criminal law is necessary under all circumstances to enforce insider trading; second, if it should be introduced at EU level. This study provides evidence of law and economics theoretical logic underlying the legal mechanisms that guide sanctioning and public enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by identifying optimal forms, natures and types of sanctions that effectively induce insider trading deterrence. The analysis further aims to reveal the economic rationality that drives the potential need for harmonization of criminal enforcement of insider trading laws within the European environment by proceeding to a comparative analysis of the current legislations of height selected Member States. This work also assesses the European Union’s most recent initiative through a critical analysis of the proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for Market Abuse. Based on the conclusions drawn from its close analysis, the study takes on the challenge of analyzing whether or not the actual European public enforcement of the laws prohibiting insider trading is coherent with the theoretical law and economics recommendations, and how these enforcement practices could be improved.
Resumo:
This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.
Resumo:
This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.