Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

La Pace Calda. La nascita del movimento antinucleare negli Stati Uniti e in Gran Bretagna, 1957-1963

The aim of this proposal is to offer an alternative perspective on the study of Cold War, since insufficient attention is usually paid to those organizations that mobilized against the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The antinuclear movement began to mobilize between the 1950s and the 1960s, when it finally gained the attention of public opinion, and helped to build a sort of global conscience about nuclear bombs. This was due to the activism of a significant part of the international scientific community, which offered powerful intellectual and political legitimization to the struggle, and to the combined actions of the scientific and organized protests. This antinuclear conscience is something we usually tend to consider as a fait accompli in contemporary world, but the question is to show its roots, and the way it influenced statesmen and political choices during the period of nuclear confrontation of the early Cold War. To understand what this conscience could be and how it should be defined, we have to look at the very meaning of the nuclear weapons that has deeply modified the sense of war. Nuclear weapons seemed to be able to destroy human beings everywhere with no realistic forms of control of the damages they could set off, and they represented the last resource in the wide range of means of mass destruction. Even if we tend to consider this idea fully rational and incontrovertible, it was not immediately born with the birth of nuclear weapons themselves. Or, better, not everyone in the world did immediately share it. Due to the particular climate of Cold War confrontation, deeply influenced by the persistence of realistic paradigms in international relations, British and U.S. governments looked at nuclear weapons simply as «a bullet». From the Trinity Test to the signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, many things happened that helped to shift this view upon nuclear weapons. First of all, more than ten years of scientific protests provided a more concerned knowledge about consequences of nuclear tests and about the use of nuclear weapons. Many scientists devoted their social activities to inform public opinion and policy-makers about the real significance of the power of the atom and the related danger for human beings. Secondly, some public figures, as physicists, philosophers, biologists, chemists, and so on, appealed directly to the human community to «leave the folly and face reality», publicly sponsoring the antinuclear conscience. Then, several organizations leaded by political, religious or radical individuals gave to this protests a formal structure. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain, as well as the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in the U.S., represented the voice of the masses against the attempts of governments to present nuclear arsenals as a fundamental part of the international equilibrium. Therefore, the antinuclear conscience could be defined as an opposite feeling to the development and the use of nuclear weapons, able to create a political issue oriented to the influence of military and foreign policies. Only taking into consideration the strength of this pressure, it seems possible to understand not only the beginning of nuclear negotiations, but also the reasons that permitted Cold War to remain cold.

Italia e Francia nell'Ungheria di Trianon (1919-1939): due modelli di penetrazione politico-culturale

Italy and France in Trianon’s Hungary: two political and cultural penetration models During the first post-war, the Danubian Europe was the theatre of an Italian-French diplomatic challenge to gain hegemony in that part of the continent. Because of his geographical position, Hungary had a decisive strategic importance for the ambitions of French and Italian foreign politics. Since in the 1920s culture and propaganda became the fourth dimension of international relations, Rome and Paris developed their diplomatic action in Hungary to affirm not only political and economic influence, but also cultural supremacy. In the 1930, after Hitler’s rise to power, the unstoppable comeback of German political influence in central-eastern Europe determined the progressive decline of Italian and French political and economic positions in Hungary: only the cultural field allowed a survey of Italian-Hungarian and French-Hungarian relations in the contest of a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Nevertheless, the radical geopolitical changes in second post-war Europe did not compromise Italian and French cultural presence in the new communist Hungary. Although cultural diplomacy is originally motivated by contingent political targets, it doesn’t respect the short time of politics, but it’s the only foreign politics tool that guarantees preservations of bilateral relations in the long run.

Ahmedabad | Laboratorio di architettura moderna Il National Institute of Design (1961-68) fra contatti internazionali ed echi della tradizione

Oggetto della ricerca è lo studio del National Institute of Design (NID), progettato da Gautam Sarabhai e sua sorella Gira, ad Ahmedabad, assunta a paradigma del nuovo corso della politica che il Primo Ministro Nehru espresse nei primi decenni del governo postcoloniale. Obiettivo della tesi è di analizzare il fenomeno che unisce modernità e tradizione in architettura. La modernità indiana, infatti, nacque e si sviluppò con i caratteri di un Giano bifronte: da un lato, la politica del Primo Ministro Nehru favorì lo sviluppo dell’industria e della scienza; dall’altro, la visione di Gandhi mirava alla riscoperta del locale, delle tradizioni e dell’artigianato. Questi orientamenti influenzarono l’architettura postcoloniale. Negli anni ‘50 e ’60 Ahmedabad divenne la culla dell’architettura moderna indiana. Kanvinde, i Sarabhai, Correa, Doshi, Raje trovarono qui le condizioni per costruire la propria identità come progettisti e come intellettuali. I motori che resero possibile questo fermento furono principalmente due: una committenza di imprenditori illuminati, desiderosi di modernizzare la città; la presenza ad Ahmedabad, a partire dal 1951, dei maestri dell’architettura moderna, tra cui i più noti furono Le Corbusier e Kahn, invitati da quella stessa committenza, per la quale realizzarono edifici di notevole rilevanza. Ad Ahmedabad si confrontarono con forza entrambe le visioni dell’India moderna. Lo sforzo maggiore degli architetti indiani si espresse nel tentativo di conciliare i due aspetti, quelli che derivavano dalle influenze internazionali e quelli che provenivano dallo spirito della tradizione. Il progetto del NID è uno dei migliori esempi di questo esercizio di sintesi. Esso recupera nella composizione spaziale la lezione di Wright, Le Corbusier, Kahn, Eames ibridandola con elementi della tradizione indiana. Nell’uso sapiente della struttura modulare e a padiglione, della griglia ordinatrice a base quadrata, dell’integrazione costante fra spazi aperti, natura e architettura affiorano nell’edificio del NID echi di una cultura millenaria.

Giochi diplomatici. Sport e politica estera nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1943-1953)

Questa tesi di dottorato, partendo dall’assunto teorico secondo cui lo sport, pur essendo un fenomeno periferico e non decisivo del sistema politico internazionale, debba considerarsi, in virtù della sua elevata visibilità, sia come un componente delle relazioni internazionali sia come uno strumento di politica estera, si pone l’obiettivo di investigare, con un approccio di tipo storico-politico, l’attività internazionale dello sport italiano nel decennio che va dal 1943 al 1953. Nello specifico viene dedicata una particolare attenzione agli attori e alle istituzioni della “politica estera sportiva”, al rientro dello sport italiano nel consesso internazionale e alla sua forza legittimante di attrazione culturale. Vengono approfonditi altresì alcuni casi relativi a «crisi politiche» che influirono sullo sport e a «crisi sportive» che influenzarono la politica. La ricerca viene portata avanti con lo scopo primario di far emergere, da un lato se e quanto coscientemente lo sport sia stato usato come strumento di politica estera da parte dei governi e della diplomazia dell’Italia repubblicana, dall’altro quanto e con quale intensità lo sviluppo dell’attività internazionale dello sport italiano abbia avuto significative ripercussioni sull’andamento e dai rapporti di forza della politica internazionale.