Knowledge Flows and Networks: the Interplay between Local and Global Linkages within Bangalore IT Cluster

This doctoral work gains deeper insight into the dynamics of knowledge flows within and across clusters, unfolding their features, directions and strategic implications. Alliances, networks and personnel mobility are acknowledged as the three main channels of inter-firm knowledge flows, thus offering three heterogeneous measures to analyze the phenomenon. The interplay between the three channels and the richness of available research methods, has allowed for the elaboration of three different papers and perspectives. The common empirical setting is the IT cluster in Bangalore, for its distinguished features as a high-tech cluster and for its steady yearly two-digit growth around the service-based business model. The first paper deploys both a firm-level and a tie-level analysis, exploring the cases of 4 domestic companies and of 2 MNCs active the cluster, according to a cluster-based perspective. The distinction between business-domain knowledge and technical knowledge emerges from the qualitative evidence, further confirmed by quantitative analyses at tie-level. At firm-level, the specialization degree seems to be influencing the kind of knowledge shared, while at tie-level both the frequency of interaction and the governance mode prove to determine differences in the distribution of knowledge flows. The second paper zooms out and considers the inter-firm networks; particularly focusing on the role of cluster boundary, internal and external networks are analyzed, in their size, long-term orientation and exploration degree. The research method is purely qualitative and allows for the observation of the evolving strategic role of internal network: from exploitation-based to exploration-based. Moreover, a causal pattern is emphasized, linking the evolution and features of the external network to the evolution and features of internal network. The final paper addresses the softer and more micro-level side of knowledge flows: personnel mobility. A social capital perspective is here developed, which considers both employees’ acquisition and employees’ loss as building inter-firm ties, thus enhancing company’s overall social capital. Negative binomial regression analyses at dyad-level test the significant impact of cluster affiliation (cluster firms vs non-cluster firms), industry affiliation (IT firms vs non-IT fims) and foreign affiliation (MNCs vs domestic firms) in shaping the uneven distribution of personnel mobility, and thus of knowledge flows, among companies.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.