2 resultados para Intellectual Task Solver
em AMS Tesi di Dottorato - Alm@DL - Università di Bologna
Resumo:
A prevalent claim is that we are in knowledge economy. When we talk about knowledge economy, we generally mean the concept of “Knowledge-based economy” indicating the use of knowledge and technologies to produce economic benefits. Hence knowledge is both tool and raw material (people’s skill) for producing some kind of product or service. In this kind of environment economic organization is undergoing several changes. For example authority relations are less important, legal and ownership-based definitions of the boundaries of the firm are becoming irrelevant and there are only few constraints on the set of coordination mechanisms. Hence what characterises a knowledge economy is the growing importance of human capital in productive processes (Foss, 2005) and the increasing knowledge intensity of jobs (Hodgson, 1999). Economic processes are also highly intertwined with social processes: they are likely to be informal and reciprocal rather than formal and negotiated. Another important point is also the problem of the division of labor: as economic activity becomes mainly intellectual and requires the integration of specific and idiosyncratic skills, the task of dividing the job and assigning it to the most appropriate individuals becomes arduous, a “supervisory problem” (Hogdson, 1999) emerges and traditional hierarchical control may result increasingly ineffective. Not only specificity of know how makes it awkward to monitor the execution of tasks, more importantly, top-down integration of skills may be difficult because ‘the nominal supervisors will not know the best way of doing the job – or even the precise purpose of the specialist job itself – and the worker will know better’ (Hogdson,1999). We, therefore, expect that the organization of the economic activity of specialists should be, at least partially, self-organized. The aim of this thesis is to bridge studies from computer science and in particular from Peer-to-Peer Networks (P2P) to organization theories. We think that the P2P paradigm well fits with organization problems related to all those situation in which a central authority is not possible. We believe that P2P Networks show a number of characteristics similar to firms working in a knowledge-based economy and hence that the methodology used for studying P2P Networks can be applied to organization studies. Three are the main characteristics we think P2P have in common with firms involved in knowledge economy: - Decentralization: in a pure P2P system every peer is an equal participant, there is no central authority governing the actions of the single peers; - Cost of ownership: P2P computing implies shared ownership reducing the cost of owing the systems and the content, and the cost of maintaining them; - Self-Organization: it refers to the process in a system leading to the emergence of global order within the system without the presence of another system dictating this order. These characteristics are present also in the kind of firm that we try to address and that’ why we have shifted the techniques we adopted for studies in computer science (Marcozzi et al., 2005; Hales et al., 2007 [39]) to management science.
Resumo:
From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School’s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, “instant scalability”, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR “will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.”1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories’ perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!