La responsabilità del vettore terrestre nel trasporto di cose per conto terzi: riflessi assicurativi.

La ricerca ha ad oggetto l’analisi della disciplina della responsabilità del vettore terrestre di merci per conto terzi ed i riflessi che detta disciplina ha avuto modo di svilupparsi nel mercato assicurativo. L’attenzione è stata rivolta al contratto di trasporto di cose in generale, seguendone la disciplina codicistica e le evoluzioni legislative intervenute. Particolare rilievo assume la novella apportata all’art. 1696 c.c., introdotta dall’art. 10 del Dlgs. 286/2005, grazie alla quale l’ordinamento italiano ha potuto codificare il limite di indennizzo dovuto dal vettore nell’ipotesi di colpa lieve, L’introduzione del limite legale di indennizzo per le ipotesi di responsabilità per perdita o avaria della merce trasportata ha generato nel mondo assicurativo interessanti reazioni. L’elaborato esamina anche l’evoluzione giurisprudenziale formatisi in tema di responsabilità vettoriale, evidenziando il crescente rigore imposto dalla giurisprudenza fondato sul principio del receptum. Tale fenomeno ha visto immediata reazione nel mercato assicurativo il quale, sulla base di testi contrattuali non dissimili tra le diverse compagnie di assicurazioni operanti sul mercato domestico e che traevano origine dai formulari approvati dall’ANIA, ha seguito l’evoluzione giurisprudenziale apportando significative restrizioni al rischio tipico previsto dalle coperture della responsabilità civile vettoriale. La ricerca si è poi focalizzata sull’esame delle più comuni clausole contemplate dalle polizze di assicurazioni di responsabilità civile e sul loro significato alla luce delle disposizioni di legge in materia. Tale analisi riveste preminente interesse poiché consente di verificare in concreto come l’assicurazione possa effettivamente costituire per l’impresa di trasporto non tanto un costo bensì una opportunità di risparmio da un lato ed un modello comportamentale, sebbene indotto, dall’altro lato per il raggiungimento di quei canoni di diligenza che qualsiasi operatore del settore dovrebbe tenere durante l’esecuzione del trasporto ed il cui venir meno determina, come detto, sensibili effetti pregiudizievoli di carattere economico.

Medical Malpractice in Public Healthcare Systems: An Empirical Investigation of Scheduled Damages

In the last decades, medical malpractice has been framed as one of the most critical issues for healthcare providers and health policy, holding a central role on both the policy agenda and public debate. The Law and Economics literature has devoted much attention to medical malpractice and to the investigation of the impact of malpractice reforms. Nonetheless, some reforms have been much less empirically studied as in the case of schedules, and their effects remain highly debated. The present work seeks to contribute to the study of medical malpractice and of schedules of noneconomic damages in a civil law country with a public national health system, using Italy as case study. Besides considering schedules and exploiting a quasi-experimental setting, the novelty of our contribution consists in the inclusion of the performance of the judiciary (measured as courts’ civil backlog) in the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis is twofold. First, it investigates how limiting compensations for pain and suffering through schedules impacts on the malpractice insurance market in terms of presence of private insurers and of premiums applied. Second, it examines whether, and to what extent, healthcare providers react to the implementation of this policy in terms of both levels and composition of the medical treatments offered. Our findings show that the introduction of schedules increases the presence of insurers only in inefficient courts, while it does not produce significant effects on paid premiums. Judicial inefficiency is attractive to insurers for average values of schedules penetration of the market, with an increasing positive impact of inefficiency as the territorial coverage of schedules increases. Moreover, the implementation of schedules tends to reduce the use of defensive practices on the part of clinicians, but the magnitude of this impact is ultimately determined by the actual degree of backlog of the court implementing schedules.

The secondary market for life insurance policies in the United States market evolution and product valuation

In this work we discuss the secondary market for life insurance policies in the United States of America. First, we give an overview of the life settlement market: how it came into existence, its growth prospects and the ethical issues it arises. Secondly, we discuss the characteristics of the different life insurance products present in the market and describe how life settlements are originated. Life settlement transactions tend to be long and complex transactions that require the involvement of a number of parties. Also, a direct investment into life insurance policies is fraught with a number of practical issues and entails risks that are not directly related to longevity. This may reduce the efficiency of a direct investment in physical policies. For these reasons, a synthetic longevity market has evolved. The number of parties involved in a synthetic longevity transaction is typically smaller and the broker-dealer transferring the longevity exposure will be retaining most or all of the risks a physical investment entails. Finally, we describe the main methods used in the market to evaluate life settlement investments and the role of life expectancy providers.

Essays on Unemployment Insurance

Can the potential availability of unemployment insurance (UI) affect the behavior of employed workers and the duration of their employment spells? After discussing few straightforward reasons why UI may affect employment duration, I apply a regression kink design (RKD) to address this question using linked employer-employee data from the Brazilian labor market. Exploiting the UI schedule, I find that potential benefit level significantly affects the duration of employment spells. This effect is local to low skilled workers and, surprisingly, indicates that a 1\% increase in unemployment benefits increases job duration by around 0.3\%. Such result is driven by the fact that higher UI decreases the probability of job quits, which are not covered by UI in Brazil. These estimates are robust to permutation tests and a number of falsification tests. I develop a reduced-form welfare formula to assess the economic relevance of this result. Based on that, I show that the positive effect on employment duration implies in a higher optimal benefit level. Moreover, the formula shows that the elasticity of employment duration impacts welfare just with the same weight as the well-known elasticity of unemployment duration to benefit level.