Determining the effect of regulation on Microfinance Institutions Financial Self-Sustainability. A Cross-Country Comparison

Microfinance is an initiative which seeks to address financial inclusion, micro-entrepreneurship, and poverty reduction without over burdening governments. However, the current sector of microfinance is still heavily dependent on the good will of donors. The over-reliance on donations is a feature which threatens the long term sustainability of microfinance. Much has been written about this reliance, but research to date hasn’t empirically examined the effect of regulation as a mediator. This is a critical area of study because regulation directly affects Microfinance Institutions’ (MFI) innovation, and innovation is what shapes the future of microfinance. This thesis considers the role that regulation plays in affecting MFI’s and their ability to innovate in products, services and long-term sustainability via access to capital. Interviews were undertaken with stakeholders in MFI’s, NGO’s, Self-Regulating Bodies, and Regulators in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This thesis discusses findings from interviews in relation to regulatory measures regarding financial self-sustainability of MFI’s. The conclusions of this thesis have implications for policy and inform the microfinance literature.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.