Privacy Tradeoffs in Information Technology Law

The thesis aims to make the dynamics of the tradeoffs involving privacy more visible; both theoretically and in two of the central current policy debates in European data protection law, the right to be forgotten and online tracking. In doing so, it offers an explanation for data protection law from an economic perspective and provides a basis for the evaluation of further data protection measures.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Intangible resources and organization capital: measurement and economic evaluation

Intangible resources have raised the interests of scholars from different research areas due to their importance as crucial factors for firm performance; yet, contributions to this field still lack a theoretical framework. This research analyses the state-of-the-art results reached in the literature concerning intangibles, their main features and evaluation problems and models. In search for a possible theoretical framework, the research draws a kind of indirect analysis of intangibles through the theories of the firm, their critic and developments. The heterodox approaches of the evolutionary theory and resource-based view are indicated as possible frameworks. Based on this theoretical analysis, organization capital (OC) is identified, for its features, as the most important intangible for firm performance. Empirical studies on the relationship intangibles-firm performance have been sporadic and have failed to reach firm conclusions with respect to OC; in the attempt to fill this gap, the effect of OC is tested on a large sample of European firms using the Compustat Global database. OC is proxied by capitalizing an income statement item (Selling, General and Administrative expenses) that includes expenses linked to information technology, business process design, reputation enhancement and employee training. This measure of OC is employed in a cross-sectional estimation of a firm level production function - modeled with different functional specifications (Cobb-Douglas and Translog) - that measures OC contribution to firm output and profitability. Results are robust and confirm the importance of OC for firm performance.