A Unitary Approach to Information and Estimation Theory in Digital Communication Systems

This thesis presents the outcomes of a Ph.D. course in telecommunications engineering. It is focused on the optimization of the physical layer of digital communication systems and it provides innovations for both multi- and single-carrier systems. For the former type we have first addressed the problem of the capacity in presence of several nuisances. Moreover, we have extended the concept of Single Frequency Network to the satellite scenario, and then we have introduced a novel concept in subcarrier data mapping, resulting in a very low PAPR of the OFDM signal. For single carrier systems we have proposed a method to optimize constellation design in presence of a strong distortion, such as the non linear distortion provided by satellites' on board high power amplifier, then we developed a method to calculate the bit/symbol error rate related to a given constellation, achieving an improved accuracy with respect to the traditional Union Bound with no additional complexity. Finally we have designed a low complexity SNR estimator, which saves one-half of multiplication with respect to the ML estimator, and it has similar estimation accuracy.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.