4 resultados para Home economics extension workers.
em AMS Tesi di Dottorato - Alm@DL - Università di Bologna
Resumo:
The present thesis investigates the issue of work-family conflict and facilitation in a sanitarian contest, using the DISC Model (De Jonge and Dormann, 2003, 2006). The general aim has been declined in two empirical studies reported in this dissertation chapters. Chapter 1 reporting the psychometric properties of the Demand-Induced Strain Compensation Questionnaire. Although the empirical evidence on the DISC Model has received a fair amount of attention in literature both for the theoretical principles and for the instrument developed to display them (DISQ; De Jonge, Dormann, Van Vegchel, Von Nordheim, Dollard, Cotton and Van den Tooren, 2007) there are no studies based solely on psychometric investigation of the instrument. In addition, no previous studies have ever used the DISC as a model or measurement instrument in an Italian context. Thus the first chapter of the present dissertation was based on psychometric investigation of the DISQ. Chapter 2 reporting a longitudinal study contribution. The purpose was to examine, using the DISC model, the relationship between emotional job characteristics, work-family interface and emotional exhaustion among a health care population. We started testing the Triple Match Principle of the DISC Model using solely the emotional dimension of the strain-stress process (i.e. emotional demands, emotional resources and emotional exhaustion). Then we investigated the mediator role played by w-f conflict and w-f facilitation in relation to emotional job characteristics and emotional exhaustion. Finally we compared the mediator model across workers involved in chronic illness home demands and workers who are not involved. Finally, a general conclusion, integrated and discussed the main findings of the studies reported in this dissertation.
Resumo:
The thesis contemplates 4 papers and its main goal is to provide evidence on the prominent impact that behavioral analysis can play into the personnel economics domain.The research tool prevalently used in the thesis is the experimental analysis.The first paper provide laboratory evidence on how the standard screening model–based on the assumption that the pecuniary dimension represents the main workerschoice variable–fails when intrinsic motivation is introduced into the analysis.The second paper explores workers behavioral reactions when dealing with supervisors that may incur in errors in the assessment of their job performance.In particular,deserving agents that have exerted high effort may not be rewarded(Type-I errors)and undeserving agents that have exerted low effort may be rewarded(Type-II errors).Although a standard neoclassical model predicts both errors to be equally detrimental for effort provision,this prediction fails when tested through a laboratory experiment.Findings from this study suggest how failing to reward deserving agents is significantly more detrimental than rewarding undeserving agents.The third paper investigates the performance of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on schooling achievement.The study is conducted through a field experiment.Students randomized to the main treatments have been incentivized to cooperate or to compete in order to earn additional exam points.Consistently with the theoretical model proposed in the paper,the level of effort in the competitive scheme proved to be higher than in the cooperative setting.Interestingly however,this result is characterized by a strong gender effect.The fourth paper exploits a natural experiment setting generated by the credit crunch occurred in the UK in the2007.The economic turmoil has negatively influenced the private sector,while public sector employees have not been directly hit by the crisis.This shock–through the rise of the unemployment rate and the increasing labor market uncertainty–has generated an exogenous variation in the opportunity cost of maternity leave in private sector labor force.This paper identifies the different responses.
Resumo:
In the first paper, I assess if financial incentives may be used as an effective device to induce workers to postpone retirement by evaluating the Italian so called “super bonus” reform. The bonus consisted in economic incentives given for a limited period to private sector workers who had reached the requirements for seniority pension. Crucially for this study, public workers were not entitled to the bonus. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income andWealth, and exploiting the DID-Probit strategy proposed by Blundell et al. (JEEA, 2004), I assess the effect of the bonus on the decision to postpone retirement, by comparing private and public workers before and after the reform. Results suggest a reduction of 12ppt in the proportion of private workers who decided to retire among those qualifying for retirement. Results also suggest, not trivially, that most of the effect of the reform is driven by low-income workers. Finally, I propose an estimate of the extensive margin elasticity of Italian older workers. The second study estimates a structural reduced form of the “option value” model developed by Stock and Wise (1990) using Italian data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).Exploiting exogenous changes in social security wealth (SSW) results show a significant effect in the expected direction of SSW and of marginal incentives to retire. Results are robust even after controlling for individual heterogeneity and its correlation with financial incentives. Using detailed information on individuals, the results also highlights the importance of individual and job characteristics, which have been very little explored by this literature, as determinants of retirement. This suggests the potential of “tagging” in the design of social security incentives in order to reduce choice distortions and improve the overall efficiency of the system.