Giustizia sanitaria e diseguaglianze globali in salute: il caso dell'aiuto allo sviluppo in sanità

Life expectancy at birth is the average number of years that a group of people born in the same year should live. The estimate for those born in 2010 is 80.2 years for Italy. On the other side of the chart are a number of countries in sub Saharan Africa. Haiti is in last place: children born in this country in 2010 have a life expectancy by an average of even 30 years, fifty in less than peers born in Italy. From a bioethical point of view, the first question that arises is: Is it right? Is it right that there is such inequality in health? The answer is simple: it is not right. But if we ask ourselves what are the best solution to remedy this situation, the answers become more than one. The differences in life expectancy depends on many factors, including no doubt the effectiveness of health systems. The scope of this work is precisely that of justice in health care and how the different general concepts related to it can be applied in health care settings with very limited financial and human resources. The first chapter describes the main inequalities in global health. The second discusses the main theories of justice. In the next chapter we reason on official development assistance and health cooperation. In the fourth we analyze the contribution of theories of justice through such issues as equity in health, the right of access to health services and right to health. In the fifth chapter the aim is to reason about global justice, the role of health in this context and how the official development assistance in health can contribute.

Work and Family: a complex interplay. An Italian application of the DISC Model on health care workers

The present thesis investigates the issue of work-family conflict and facilitation in a sanitarian contest, using the DISC Model (De Jonge and Dormann, 2003, 2006). The general aim has been declined in two empirical studies reported in this dissertation chapters. Chapter 1 reporting the psychometric properties of the Demand-Induced Strain Compensation Questionnaire. Although the empirical evidence on the DISC Model has received a fair amount of attention in literature both for the theoretical principles and for the instrument developed to display them (DISQ; De Jonge, Dormann, Van Vegchel, Von Nordheim, Dollard, Cotton and Van den Tooren, 2007) there are no studies based solely on psychometric investigation of the instrument. In addition, no previous studies have ever used the DISC as a model or measurement instrument in an Italian context. Thus the first chapter of the present dissertation was based on psychometric investigation of the DISQ. Chapter 2 reporting a longitudinal study contribution. The purpose was to examine, using the DISC model, the relationship between emotional job characteristics, work-family interface and emotional exhaustion among a health care population. We started testing the Triple Match Principle of the DISC Model using solely the emotional dimension of the strain-stress process (i.e. emotional demands, emotional resources and emotional exhaustion). Then we investigated the mediator role played by w-f conflict and w-f facilitation in relation to emotional job characteristics and emotional exhaustion. Finally we compared the mediator model across workers involved in chronic illness home demands and workers who are not involved. Finally, a general conclusion, integrated and discussed the main findings of the studies reported in this dissertation.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.