The Effectiveness of the Clean Development Mechanism – A law and economics analysis

Climate change has been acknowledged as a threat to humanity. Most scholars agree that to avert dangerous climate change and to transform economies into low-carbon societies, deep global emission reductions are required by the year 2050. Under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the only market-based instrument that encourages industrialised countries to pursue emission reductions in developing countries. The CDM aims to pay the incremental finance necessary to operationalize emission reduction projects which are otherwise not financially viable. According to the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM should finance projects that are additional to those which would have happened anyway, contribute to sustainable development in the countries hosting the projects, and be cost-effective. To enable the identification of such projects, an institutional framework has been established by the Kyoto Protocol which lays out responsibilities for public and private actors. This thesis examines whether the CDM has achieved these objectives in practice and can thus be considered an effective tool to reduce emissions. To complete this investigation, the book applies economic theory and analyses the CDM from two perspectives. The first perspective is the supply-dimension which answers the question of how, in practice, the CDM system identified additional, cost-effective, sustainable projects and, generated emission reductions. The main contribution of this book is the second perspective, the compliance-dimension, which answers the question of whether industrialised countries effectively used the CDM for compliance with their Kyoto targets. The application of the CDM in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is used as a case-study. Where the analysis identifies inefficiencies within the supply or the compliance dimension, potential improvements of the legal framework are proposed and discussed.

Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

Three Essays in Economics of Gender

During recent decades, economists' interest in gender-related issues has risen. Researchers aim to show how economic theory can be applied to gender related topics such as peer effect, labor market outcomes, and education. This dissertation aims to contribute to our understandings of the interaction, inequality and sources of differences across genders, and it consists of three empirical papers in the research area of gender economics. The aim of the first paper ("Separating gender composition effect from peer effects in education") is to demonstrate the importance of considering endogenous peer effects in order to identify gender composition effect. This fact is analytically illustrated by employing Manski's (1993) linear-in-means model. The paper derives an innovative solution to the simultaneous identification of endogenous and exogenous peer effects: gender composition effect of interest is estimated from auxiliary reduced-form estimates after identifying the endogenous peer effect by using Graham (2008) variance restriction method. The paper applies this methodology to two different data sets from American and Italian schools. The motivation of the second paper ("Gender differences in vulnerability to an economic crisis") is to analyze the different effect of recent economic crisis on the labor market outcome of men and women. Using triple differences method (before-after crisis, harder-milder hit sectors, men-women) the paper used British data at the occupation level and shows that men suffer more than women in terms of probability of losing their job. Several explanations for the findings are proposed. The third paper ("Gender gap in educational outcome") is concerned with a controversial academic debate on the existence, degree and origin of the gender gap in test scores. The existence of a gap both in mean scores and the variability around the mean is documented and analyzed. The origins of the gap are investigated by looking at wide range of possible explanations.

Bayesian Analysis of Linear Inverse Problems with Applications in Economics and Finance

In my PhD thesis I propose a Bayesian nonparametric estimation method for structural econometric models where the functional parameter of interest describes the economic agent's behavior. The structural parameter is characterized as the solution of a functional equation, or by using more technical words, as the solution of an inverse problem that can be either ill-posed or well-posed. From a Bayesian point of view, the parameter of interest is a random function and the solution to the inference problem is the posterior distribution of this parameter. A regular version of the posterior distribution in functional spaces is characterized. However, the infinite dimension of the considered spaces causes a problem of non continuity of the solution and then a problem of inconsistency, from a frequentist point of view, of the posterior distribution (i.e. problem of ill-posedness). The contribution of this essay is to propose new methods to deal with this problem of ill-posedness. The first one consists in adopting a Tikhonov regularization scheme in the construction of the posterior distribution so that I end up with a new object that I call regularized posterior distribution and that I guess it is solution of the inverse problem. The second approach consists in specifying a prior distribution on the parameter of interest of the g-prior type. Then, I detect a class of models for which the prior distribution is able to correct for the ill-posedness also in infinite dimensional problems. I study asymptotic properties of these proposed solutions and I prove that, under some regularity condition satisfied by the true value of the parameter of interest, they are consistent in a "frequentist" sense. Once I have set the general theory, I apply my bayesian nonparametric methodology to different estimation problems. First, I apply this estimator to deconvolution and to hazard rate, density and regression estimation. Then, I consider the estimation of an Instrumental Regression that is useful in micro-econometrics when we have to deal with problems of endogeneity. Finally, I develop an application in finance: I get the bayesian estimator for the equilibrium asset pricing functional by using the Euler equation defined in the Lucas'(1978) tree-type models.