Development Aid to Water Management in Mali: The Actors, ‘Global’ Paradigms, and ‘Local’ Translations

Development aid involves a complex network of numerous and extremely heterogeneous actors. Nevertheless, all actors seem to speak the same ‘development jargon’ and to display a congruence that extends from the donor over the professional consultant to the village chief. And although the ideas about what counts as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aid have constantly changed over time —with new paradigms and policies sprouting every few years— the apparent congruence between actors more or less remains unchanged. How can this be explained? Is it a strategy of all actors to get into the pocket of the donor, or are the social dynamics in development aid more complex? When a new development paradigm appears, where does it come from and how does it gain support? Is this support really homogeneous? To answer the questions, a multi-sited ethnography was conducted in the sector of water-related development aid, with a focus on 3 paradigms that are currently hegemonic in this sector: Integrated Water Resources Management, Capacity Building, and Adaptation to Climate Change. The sites of inquiry were: the headquarters of a multilateral organization, the headquarters of a development NGO, and the Inner Niger Delta in Mali. The research shows that paradigm shifts do not happen overnight but that new paradigms have long lines of descent. Moreover, they require a lot of work from actors in order to become hegemonic; the actors need to create a tight network of support. Each actor, however, interprets the paradigms in a slightly different way, depending on the position in the network. They implant their own interests in their interpretation of the paradigm (the actors ‘translate’ their interests), regardless of whether they constitute the donor, a mediator, or the aid recipient. These translations are necessary to cement and reproduce the network.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.