An interdisciplinary analysis of obesity: theory and empirical evidence

The dissertation is structured in three parts. The first part compares US and EU agricultural policies since the end of WWII. There is not enough evidence for claiming that agricultural support has a negative impact on obesity trends. I discuss the possibility of an exchange in best practices to fight obesity. There are relevant economic, societal and legal differences between the US and the EU. However, partnerships against obesity are welcomed. The second part presents a socio-ecological model of the determinants of obesity. I employ an interdisciplinary model because it captures the simultaneous influence of several variables. Obesity is an interaction of pre-birth, primary and secondary socialization factors. To test the significance of each factor, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health. I compare the average body mass index across different populations. Differences in means are statistically significant. In the last part I use the National Survey of Children Health. I analyze the effect that family characteristics, built environment, cultural norms and individual factors have on the body mass index (BMI). I use Ordered Probit models and I calculate the marginal effects. I use State and ethnicity fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. I find that southern US States tend have on average a higher probability of being obese. On the ethnicity side, White Americans have a lower BMI respect to Black Americans, Hispanics and American Indians Native Islanders; being Asian is associated with a lower probability of being obese. In neighborhoods where trust level and safety perception are higher, children are less overweight and obese. Similar results are shown for higher level of parental income and education. Breastfeeding has a negative impact. Higher values of measures of behavioral disorders have a positive and significant impact on obesity, as predicted by the theory.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.