Essays in Financial Econometrics

The first paper sheds light on the informational content of high frequency data and daily data. I assess the economic value of the two family models comparing their performance in forecasting asset volatility through the Value at Risk metric. In running the comparison this paper introduces two key assumptions: jumps in prices and leverage effect in volatility dynamics. Findings suggest that high frequency data models do not exhibit a superior performance over daily data models. In the second paper, building on Majewski et al. (2015), I propose an affine-discrete time model, labeled VARG-J, which is characterized by a multifactor volatility specification. In the VARG-J model volatility experiences periods of extreme movements through a jump factor modeled as an Autoregressive Gamma Zero process. The estimation under historical measure is done by quasi-maximum likelihood and the Extended Kalman Filter. This strategy allows to filter out both volatility factors introducing a measurement equation that relates the Realized Volatility to latent volatility. The risk premia parameters are calibrated using call options written on S&P500 Index. The results clearly illustrate the important contribution of the jump factor in the pricing performance of options and the economic significance of the volatility jump risk premia. In the third paper, I analyze whether there is empirical evidence of contagion at the bank level, measuring the direction and the size of contagion transmission between European markets. In order to understand and quantify the contagion transmission on banking market, I estimate the econometric model by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2015) in which contagion is defined as the within and between countries transmission of shocks and asset returns are directly modeled as a Hawkes jump diffusion process. The empirical analysis indicates that there is a clear evidence of contagion from Greece to European countries as well as self-contagion in all countries.

Educational mismathc in Italian an European labour markets (starting from the UK)

The present doctoral thesis is structured as a collection of three essays. The first essay, “SOC(HE)-Italy: a classification for graduate occupations” presents the conceptual basis, the construction, the validation and the application to the Italian labour force of the occupational classification termed SOC(HE)-Italy. I have developed this classification under the supervision of Kate Purcell during my period as a visiting research student at the Warwick Institute for Emplyment Research. This classification links the constituent tasks and duties of a particular job to the relevant knowledge and skills imparted via Higher Education (HE). It is based onto the SOC(HE)2010, an occupational classification first proposed by Kate Purcell in 2013, but differently constructed. In the second essay “Assessing the incidence and wage effects of overeducation among Italian graduates using a new measure for educational requirements” I utilize this classification to build a valid and reliable measure for job requirements. The lack of an unbiased measure for this dimension constitutes one of the major constraints to achieve a generally accepted measurement of overeducation. Estimations of overeducation incidence and wage effects are run onto AlmaLaurea data from the survey on graduates career paths. I have written this essay and obtained these estimates benefiting of the help and guidance of Giovanni Guidetti and Giulio Pedrini. The third and last essay titled “Overeducation in the Italian labour market: clarifying the concepts and addressing the measurement error problem” addresses a number of theoretical issues concerning the concepts of educational mismatch and overeducation. Using Istat data from RCFL survey I run estimates of the ORU model for the whole Italian labour force. In my knowledge, this is the first time ever such model is estimated on such population. In addition, I adopt the new measure of overeducation based onto the SOC(HE)-Italy classification.

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.