The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

The special rights other than shares in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union. A perspective from the Spanish Law

The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.

The Council of Ministers of the European Union After the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon has brought remarkable changes and innovations to the European Union. As far as the Council of Ministers of the European Union (“the Council” hereinafter) is concerned, there are two significant innovations: double qualified majority voting and new rotating Presidency scheme, which are considered to make the working of the Council more efficiently, stably and consistently. With the modification relating to other key institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, and with certain procedures being re-codified, the power of the Council varies accordingly, where the inter-institutional balance counts for more research. As the Council is one of the co-legislatures of the Union, the legislative function of it would be probably influenced, positively or negatively, by the internal innovations and the inter-institutional re-balance. Has the legislative function of the Council been reinforced or not? How could the Council better reach its functional goal designed by the Treaties’ drafter? How to evaluate the Council’s evolution after Lisbon Treaty in the light of European integration? This thesis is attempting to find the answers by analyzing two main internal innovations and inter-institutional re-balance thereinafter.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.