Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

La governance della società di capitale a base familiare: "Protocolo Familiar" e Patti di Famiglia

Family businesses have acquired a very specific gravity in the economy of occidental countries, generating most of the employment and the richness for the last ages. In Spain Family Businesses represent the 65% about the total of enterprises with 1,5 million companies. They give employment to 8 million people, the 80% of the private employment and develop the 65% of the Spanish GNP (Gross National Product). Otherwise, the family business needs a complete law regulation that gives satisfaction to their own necessities and challenges. These companies have to deal with national or international economic scene to assure their permanency and competitiveness. In fact, the statistics about family companies have a medium life of 35 years. European family businesses success their successor process between a 10 and 25%. It’s said: first generation makes, second generation stays, third generation distributes. In that sense, the Recommendation of the European Commission of December 7º 1994 about the succession of the small and medium companies has reformed European internal orders according to make easier successor process and to introduce practices of family companies’ good government. So, the Italian law, under the 14th Law, February 2006, has reformed its Covil Code, appearing a new concept, called “Patto di famiglia”, wich abolish the prohibition as laid dwon in the 458 article about successors’ agreements, admitting the possibility that testator guarantees the continuity of the company or of the family society, giving it, totally or in part, to one or various of its descendents. On other hand, Spain has promulgated the 17th Royal Decree (9th February 2007), that governs the publicity of family agreements (Protocolos familiars). These “protocolo familiar” (Family Agreement) are known as accord of wills, consented and accepted unanimously of all the family members and the company, taking into account recommendations and practices of family company’s good government.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Bank Governance and the Bail-in in the EU. A Law & Finance analysis on the role of bail-inable creditors

This dissertation assesses the impact of the EU Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRRD) on bank corporate governance and investigates a fundamental question. Can the resolution framework for distressed banks enhance the quality of banks’ decision making? According to the Directive, the Resolution Authority can impose losses on bank’s creditors in case of distress through a bail-in. Bail-inable creditors become residual claimants of the bank, contingent on its distress. The first part of the dissertation establishes an analytical framework for bank governance, starting from the problem of what can be defined as “good governance” in banking. The dissertation hypothesizes that governance regulation represents a necessary link between the incentives of corporate constituencies and the goals of substantive regulation. The second part builds upon this analytical framework and carries out a positive analysis encompassing three channels of debt governance; namely, price internalisation of risk; contractual arrangements and the discrete impact of different type of creditors. The existence of a resolution framework should incentivise bail-inable creditors to better discipline the borrowing bank; yet, the design of both the capital and resolution regulation largely foreclose such possibility to creditors. Against this backdrop, the third part of the dissertation moves to normative considerations. The approach to this normative part combines and complements the study of cash flow rights of the management with the study of the voting rights to bail-inable creditors. On the cash flow side, the dissertation proposes to include bail-inable debt as part of the variable remuneration for bank risk-takers. On the voting right, the proposal is to grant a limited basket of ex-ante governance rights to bail-inable creditors. Such a unified approach is rather uncommon in the literature, where cash flow rights and voting rights are often approached separately whereas those complement each other in the dissertation.

Ethical Perspectives on Big Data in Agri-food: Ownership and Governance for Safety

Big data are reshaping the way we interact with technology, thus fostering new applications to increase the safety-assessment of foods. An extraordinary amount of information is analysed using machine learning approaches aimed at detecting the existence or predicting the likelihood of future risks. Food business operators have to share the results of these analyses when applying to place on the market regulated products, whereas agri-food safety agencies (including the European Food Safety Authority) are exploring new avenues to increase the accuracy of their evaluations by processing Big data. Such an informational endowment brings with it opportunities and risks correlated to the extraction of meaningful inferences from data. However, conflicting interests and tensions among the involved entities - the industry, food safety agencies, and consumers - hinder the finding of shared methods to steer the processing of Big data in a sound, transparent and trustworthy way. A recent reform in the EU sectoral legislation, the lack of trust and the presence of a considerable number of stakeholders highlight the need of ethical contributions aimed at steering the development and the deployment of Big data applications. Moreover, Artificial Intelligence guidelines and charters published by European Union institutions and Member States have to be discussed in light of applied contexts, including the one at stake. This thesis aims to contribute to these goals by discussing what principles should be put forward when processing Big data in the context of agri-food safety-risk assessment. The research focuses on two interviewed topics - data ownership and data governance - by evaluating how the regulatory framework addresses the challenges raised by Big data analysis in these domains. The outcome of the project is a tentative Roadmap aimed to identify the principles to be observed when processing Big data in this domain and their possible implementations.

The European legal approach to Open Science and research data

This dissertation proposes an analysis of the governance of the European scientific research, focusing on the emergence of the Open Science paradigm: a new way of doing science, oriented towards the openness of every phase of the scientific research process, able to take full advantage of the digital ICTs. The emergence of this paradigm is relatively recent, but in the last years it has become increasingly relevant. The European institutions expressed a clear intention to embrace the Open Science paradigm (eg., think about the European Open Science Cloud, EOSC; or the establishment of the Horizon Europe programme). This dissertation provides a conceptual framework for the multiple interventions of the European institutions in the field of Open Science, addressing the major legal challenges of its implementation. The study investigates the notion of Open Science, proposing a definition that takes into account all its dimensions related to the human and fundamental rights framework in which Open Science is grounded. The inquiry addresses the legal challenges related to the openness of research data, in light of the European Open Data framework and the impact of the GDPR on the context of Open Science. The last part of the study is devoted to the infrastructural dimension of the Open Science paradigm, exploring the e-infrastructures. The focus is on a specific type of computational infrastructure: the High Performance Computing (HPC) facility. The adoption of HPC for research is analysed from the European perspective, investigating the EuroHPC project, and the local perspective, proposing the case study of the HPC facility of the University of Luxembourg, the ULHPC. This dissertation intends to underline the relevance of the legal coordination approach, between all actors and phases of the process, in order to develop and implement the Open Science paradigm, adhering to the underlying human and fundamental rights.