Fundamental Dimensions of Social Judgment: Sociability and Morality as Distinct Characteristics of Social Warmth

The present dissertation focuses on the two basic dimensions of social judgment, i.e., warmth and competence. Previous research has shown that warmth and competence emerge as fundamental dimensions both at the interpersonal level and at the group level. Moreover, warmth judgments appear to be primary, reflecting the importance of first assessing others��� intentions before determining the other���s ability to carry out those intentions. Finally, it has been shown that warmth and competence judgments are predicted by perceived economic competition and status, respectively (for a review, see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). Building on this evidence, the present work intends to further explore the role of warmth and competence in social judgment, adopting a finer-grained level of analysis. Specifically, we consider warmth to be a dimension of evaluation that encompasses two distinct characteristics (i.e., sociability and morality) rather than as an undifferentiated dimension (see Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). In a similar vein, both economic competition and symbolic competition are taken into account (see Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). In order to highlight the relevance of our empirical research, the first chapter reviews the literature in social psychology that has studied the warmth and competence dimensions. In the second chapter, across two studies, we examine the role of realistic and symbolic threats (akin economic and symbolic competition, respectively) in predicting the perception of sociability and morality of social groups. In study 1, we measure perceived realistic threat, symbolic threat, sociability, and morality with respect to 8 social groups. In study 2, we manipulate the level and type of threat of a fictitious group and measure perceived sociability and morality. The findings show that realistic threat and symbolic threat are differentially related to the sociability and morality components of warmth. Specifically, whereas realistic threat seems to be a stronger predictor of sociability than symbolic threat, symbolic threat emerges as better predictor of morality than realistic threat. Thus, extending prior research, we show that the types of threat are linked to different warmth stereotypes. In the third and the fourth chapter, we examine whether the sociability and morality components of warmth play distinct roles at different stages of group impression formation. More specifically, the third chapter focuses on the information-gathering process. Two studies experimentally investigate which traits are mostly selected when forming impressions about either ingroup or outgroup members. The results clearly show that perceivers are more interested in obtaining information about morality than about sociability when asked to form a global impression about others. The fourth chapter considers more properly the formulation of an evaluative impression. Thus, in the first study participants rate real groups on sociability, morality, and competence. In the second study, participants read an immigration scenario depicting an unfamiliar social group in terms of high (vs. low) morality, sociability, and competence. In both studies, participants are also asked to report their global impression of the group. The results show that global evaluations are better predicted by morality than by sociability and competence trait ascriptions. Taken together the third and the fourth chapters show that the dominance of warmth suggested by previous studies on impression formation might be better explained in terms of a greater effect of one of the two subcomponents (i.e., morality) over the other (i.e., sociability). In the general discussion, we discuss the relevance of our findings for intergroup relation and group perception, as well as for impression formation.

The abuse of intellectual property rights and regulations in China: a law and economic analysis

From the institutional point of view, the legal system of IPR (intellectual property right, hereafter, IPR) is one of incentive institutions of innovation and it plays very important role in the development of economy. According to the law, the owner of the IPR enjoy a kind of exclusive right to use his IP(intellectual property, hereafter, IP), in other words, he enjoys a kind of legal monopoly position in the market. How to well protect the IPR and at the same time to regulate the abuse of IPR is very interested topic in this knowledge-orientated market and it is the basic research question in this dissertation. In this paper, by way of comparing study and by way of law and economic analyses, and based on the Austrian Economics School���s theories, the writer claims that there is no any contradiction between the IPR and competition law. However, in this new economy (high-technology industries), there is really probability of the owner of IPR to abuse his dominant position. And with the characteristics of the new economy, such as, the high rates of innovation, ���instant scalability���, network externality and lock-in effects, the IPR ���will vest the dominant undertakings with the power not just to monopolize the market but to shift such power from one market to another, to create strong barriers to enter and, in so doing, granting the perpetuation of such dominance for quite a long time.���1 Therefore, in order to keep the order of market, to vitalize the competition and innovation, and to benefit the customer, in EU and US, it is common ways to apply the competition law to regulate the IPR abuse. In Austrian Economic School perspective, especially the Schumpeterian theories, the innovation/competition/monopoly and entrepreneurship are inter-correlated, therefore, we should apply the dynamic antitrust model based on the AES theories to analysis the relationship between the IPR and competition law. China is still a developing country with relative not so high ability of innovation. Therefore, at present, to protect the IPR and to make good use of the incentive mechanism of IPR legal system is the first important task for Chinese government to do. However, according to the investigation reports,2 based on their IPR advantage and capital advantage, some multinational companies really obtained the dominant or monopoly market position in some aspects of some industries, and there are some IPR abuses conducted by such multinational companies. And then, the Chinese government should be paying close attention to regulate any IPR abuse. However, how to effectively regulate the IPR abuse by way of competition law in Chinese situation, from the law and economic theories��� perspective, from the legislation perspective, and from the judicial practice perspective, there is a long way for China to go!

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Topics in Local Economic Development

This thesis contributes to the current debate in literature about local economic development by considering two different topics: quality of institutions, and the role of clusters in innovation and productivity growth. The research is built upon three papers. The first paper deals with the analysis of the effect of administrative continuity on administrative efficiency. The analysis underlines the importance of different typologies of social capital. Findings reveal a positive impact on administrative efficiency (AE) by administrative continuity (AC) when it is coupled by bridging and linking social capital. On the contrary, bonding social capital influences negatively the effect by AC on AE. The second paper investigates the spatial interaction in levels of quality of government (QoG) among European regions. Notwithstanding the largely recognised role by institutions in the design of regional policies, no study has been conducted about the mechanisms of interaction and diffusion of QoG at regional level. This research wants to overcome this knowledge gap in literature. Findings reveal a heterogeneity in spatial interaction among groups of regions, i.e. ���leader regions��� (Northern regions) and ���lagging regions��� (Southern regions), when considering different mechanisms of interaction (learning / imitating competition and pure competition). Moreover, the effect of wealth on the levels of QoG is nonlinear. Finally, the third paper analyses the relation among specialization and productivity within the agricultural sector. In literature, the study of clusters dynamics has long neglected agriculture. The analysis describes the changes in sectorial specialization for eight main crop groups in Italian regions (NUTS 3), assessing the existence of spatial autocorrelations by using an exploratory data analysis. Furthermore, the effect of specialization on productivity is analysed within the main crop groups using a spatial panel data model. Findings reveal a marked tendency to specialization in the Italian agriculture, and a heterogeneous effect by specialization on productivity.

Multi-Principal Agency and the Compliance with Professional Guidelines in Health Systems: Economic and Regulatory Perspectives

Amid the trend of rising health expenditure in developed economies, changing the healthcare delivery models is an important point of action for service regulators to contain this trend. Such a change is mostly induced by either financial incentives or regulatory tools issued by the regulators and targeting service providers and patients. This creates a tripartite interaction between service regulators, professionals, and patients that manifests a multi-principal agent relationship, in which professionals are agents to two principals: regulators and patients. This thesis is concerned with such a multi-principal agent relationship in healthcare and attempts to investigate the determinants of the (non-)compliance to regulatory tools in light of this tripartite relationship. In addition, the thesis provides insights into the different institutional, economic, and regulatory settings, which govern the multi-principal agent relationship in healthcare in different countries. Furthermore, the thesis provides and empirically tests a conceptual framework of the possible determinants of (non-)compliance by physicians to regulatory tools issued by the regulator. The main findings of the thesis are first, in a multi-principal agent setting, the utilization of financial incentives to align the objectives of professionals and the regulator is important but not the only solution. This finding is based on the heterogeneity in the financial incentives provided to professionals in different health markets, which does not provide a one-size-fits-all model of financial incentives to influence clinical decisions. Second, soft law tools as clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are important tools to mitigate the problems of the multi-principal agent setting in health markets as they reduce information asymmetries while preserving the autonomy of professionals. Third, CPGs are complex and heterogeneous and so are the determinants of (non-)compliance to them. Fourth, CPGs work but under conditions. Factors such as intra-professional competition between service providers or practitioners might lead to non-compliance to CPGs ��� if CPGs are likely to reduce the professional���s utility. Finally, different degrees of soft law mandate have different effects on providers��� compliance. Generally, the stronger the mandate, the stronger the compliance, however, even with a strong mandate, drivers such as intra-professional competition and co-management of patients by different professionals affected the (non-)compliance.