Analysis and developments of uncertainty processors for real time flood forecasting

The hydrologic risk (and the hydro-geologic one, closely related to it) is, and has always been, a very relevant issue, due to the severe consequences that may be provoked by a flooding or by waters in general in terms of human and economic losses. Floods are natural phenomena, often catastrophic, and cannot be avoided, but their damages can be reduced if they are predicted sufficiently in advance. For this reason, the flood forecasting plays an essential role in the hydro-geological and hydrological risk prevention. Thanks to the development of sophisticated meteorological, hydrologic and hydraulic models, in recent decades the flood forecasting has made a significant progress, nonetheless, models are imperfect, which means that we are still left with a residual uncertainty on what will actually happen. In this thesis, this type of uncertainty is what will be discussed and analyzed. In operational problems, it is possible to affirm that the ultimate aim of forecasting systems is not to reproduce the river behavior, but this is only a means through which reducing the uncertainty associated to what will happen as a consequence of a precipitation event. In other words, the main objective is to assess whether or not preventive interventions should be adopted and which operational strategy may represent the best option. The main problem for a decision maker is to interpret model results and translate them into an effective intervention strategy. To make this possible, it is necessary to clearly define what is meant by uncertainty, since in the literature confusion is often made on this issue. Therefore, the first objective of this thesis is to clarify this concept, starting with a key question: should be the choice of the intervention strategy to adopt based on the evaluation of the model prediction based on its ability to represent the reality or on the evaluation of what actually will happen on the basis of the information given by the model forecast? Once the previous idea is made unambiguous, the other main concern of this work is to develope a tool that can provide an effective decision support, making possible doing objective and realistic risk evaluations. In particular, such tool should be able to provide an uncertainty assessment as accurate as possible. This means primarily three things: it must be able to correctly combine all the available deterministic forecasts, it must assess the probability distribution of the predicted quantity and it must quantify the flooding probability. Furthermore, given that the time to implement prevention strategies is often limited, the flooding probability will have to be linked to the time of occurrence. For this reason, it is necessary to quantify the flooding probability within a horizon time related to that required to implement the intervention strategy and it is also necessary to assess the probability of the flooding time.

The Structure of Financial Supervision: Consolidation or Fragmentation for Financial Regulators?

This research was designed to answer the question of which direction the restructuring of financial regulators should take – consolidation or fragmentation. This research began by examining the need for financial regulation and its related costs. It then continued to describe what types of regulatory structures exist in the world; surveying the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses. This research analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools: Game-Theory, Institutional-Design, and Network-Effects. The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory mandates will behave in two different states of the world (where they can stand to benefit from regulating and where they stand to lose). The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world. The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five using tools from institutional design. The idea is based on the need for the right kind of information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to predict, mitigate or stop a financial crisis from occurring. Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed in Chapter Six which applied the literature referring to network effects in general in an attempt to conclude whether consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global level might also yield other positive network effects. Returning to the main research question, this research concluded that in general the fragmented model should be preferable to the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used.

Essays on Information Economics

This thesis consists of three essays on information economics. I explore how information is strategically communicated or designed by senders who aim to influence the decisions of a receiver. In the first chapter, I study a cheap talk game between two imperfectly informed experts and a decision maker. The experts receive noisy signals about the state and sequentially communicate the relevant information to the decision maker. I refine the self-serving belief system under uncertainty and Ι characterise the most informative equilibrium that might arise in such environments.In the second chapter, I consider the case where a decision maker seeks advice from a biased expert who cares also about establishing a reputation of being competent. The expert has the incentives to misreport her information but she faces a trade-off between the gain from misrepresentation and the potential reputation loss. I show that the equilibrium is fully-revealing if the expert is not too biased and not too highly reputable. If there is competition between two experts the information transmission is always improved. However, in cases where the experts are more than two the result is ambiguous, and it depends on the players’ prior belief over states.In the last chapter, I consider a model of strategic communication where a privately and imperfectly informed sender can persuade a receiver. The sender may receive favorable or unfavorable private information about her preferred state. I describe two ways that are adopted in real life situations and theoretically improve equilibrium informativeness given sender's private information. First, a policy that suggests symmetry constraints to the experiments' choice. Second, an approval strategy characterised by a low precision threshold where the receiver will accept the sender with a positive probability and a higher one where the sender will be accepted with certainty.