L'anno che non fu? L'anno dell'Europa e la crisi nelle relazioni transatlantiche, 1973/74

The 1970s are in the limelight of a growing historiographic attention, partly due to the recent opening of new archival resources. 1973, in particular, has a special interest in the historian’s eyes, as many are the events that happened that year: to name but a few, the Chilean coup, the October War, the ensuing oil crisis, the Vietnamese peace treaty. So it is may be not entirely surprising that not much attention has been paid to the Year of Europe, a nebulous American initiative destined to sum up to nothing practical - as Kissinger himself put it, it was destined to be the Year that never Was.1 It is my opinion, however, that its failure should not conceal its historical interest. Even though transatlantic relations have sometimes been seen as an uninterrupted history of crisis,2 in 1973 they reached what could then be considered as their unprecedented nadir. I believe that a thorough analysis of the events that during that year found the US increasingly at odds with the countries of Western Europe is worth carrying out not only to cast a new light on the dynamics of transatlantic relations but also to deepen our comprehension of the internal dynamics of the actors involved, mainly the Nixon administration and a unifying Europe. The Nixon administration had not carefully planned what the initiative actually should have amounted to, and its official announcement appears to have been one of Kissinger’s coups de theatre. Yet the Year of Europe responded to the vital priority of revitalising the relations with Western Europe, crucial ally, for too long neglected. But 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had sought. On the contrary, it saw, for the first time, the countries of the newly enlarged EC engaged in a real, if short-lived, solidarity on foreign policy, which highlighted the Nixon administration’s contradictions regarding European integration. Those, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehensions and misperceptions, which the unexpected deflagration of the October war seriously worsened. However, even though the tensions did not disappear, the European front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil crisis. Significant changes in the leadership of the main European countries helped to get the tones back to normal. During the course of 1974-5, the substantial failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Gymlich compromise, frequent and serene bilateral meetings bear witness that the worst was over.

Essays on the Empirical Analysis of Economic and Political Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa, non-democratic events, like civil wars and coup d'etat, destroy economic development. This study investigates both domestic and spatial effects on the likelihood of civil wars and coup d'etat. To civil wars, an increase of income growth is one of common research conclusions to stop wars. This study adds a concern on ethnic fractionalization. IV-2SLS is applied to overcome causality problem. The findings document that income growth is significant to reduce number and degree of violence in high ethnic fractionalized countries, otherwise they are trade-off. Income growth reduces amount of wars, but increases its violent level, in the countries with few large ethnic groups. Promoting growth should consider ethnic composition. This study also investigates the clustering and contagion of civil wars using spatial panel data models. Onset, incidence and end of civil conflicts spread across the network of neighboring countries while peace, the end of conflicts, diffuse only with the nearest neighbor. There is an evidence of indirect links from neighboring income growth, without too much inequality, to reduce the likelihood of civil wars. To coup d'etat, this study revisits its diffusion for both all types of coups and only successful ones. The results find an existence of both domestic and spatial determinants in different periods. Domestic income growth plays major role to reduce the likelihood of coup before cold war ends, while spatial effects do negative afterward. Results on probability to succeed coup are similar. After cold war ends, international organisations seriously promote democracy with pressure against coup d'etat, and it seems to be effective. In sum, this study indicates the role of domestic ethnic fractionalization and the spread of neighboring effects to the likelihood of non-democratic events in a country. Policy implementation should concern these factors.