Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Retrofit Options to Support Decision Making

How to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of repair/retrofit intervention vs. demolition/replacement and what level of shaking intensity can the chosen repairing/retrofit technique sustain are open questions affecting either the pre-earthquake prevention, the post-earthquake emergency and the reconstruction phases. The (mis)conception that the cost of retrofit interventions would increase linearly with the achieved seismic performance (%NBS) often discourages stakeholders to consider repair/retrofit options in a post-earthquake damage situation. Similarly, in a pre-earthquake phase, the minimum (by-law) level of %NBS might be targeted, leading in some cases to no-action. Furthermore, the performance measure enforcing owners to take action, the %NBS, is generally evaluated deterministically. Not directly reflecting epistemic and aleatory uncertainties, the assessment can result in misleading confidence on the expected performance. The present study aims at contributing to the delicate decision-making process of repair/retrofit vs. demolition/replacement, by developing a framework to assist stakeholders with the evaluation of the effects in terms of long-term losses and benefits of an increment in their initial investment (targeted retrofit level) and highlighting the uncertainties hidden behind a deterministic approach. For a pre-1970 case study building, different retrofit solutions are considered, targeting different levels of %NBS, and the actual probability of reaching Collapse when considering a suite of ground-motions is evaluated, providing a correlation between %NBS and Risk. Both a simplified and a probabilistic loss modelling are then undertaken to study the relationship between %NBS and expected direct and indirect losses.