Incentives, Sustainability, and Law: The relationship between executive pay regulation and corporate social responsibility

What is the relationship between executive pay regulation and corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Currently, CSR is neither sufficiently included in economic research on executive pay, nor is pay regulation considered as a potential instrument in the growing body of CSR legislation. The successful proliferation of CSR in business practice and the attention policymakers and legislators now pay to it, however, have raised the importance of answering these questions. Thus, this blind spot in corporate governance—the relationship between compensation, CSR, and law—is the topic of this thesis. The dissertation approaches these issues in two subsequent research question: first, the role of executive pay regulation as an institutional determinant of CSR engagement is identified. From the results of this, the second research question arises: should legislators promote CSR engagement and—if so—how? Lastly, a case study is conducted to map how the influence of index funds as an important driver of CSR in corporate governance should be accommodated in the design of CSR legislation. The research project shows that pay regulation is part of the institutional determinants of CSR and, depending on its design, can incentivise or discourage different forms of CSR engagement. As a form of private self-regulation, CSR is closely interconnected with legal rules and the result of complex underlying drivers inside and outside the firm. The study develops a differentiation of CSR activities to accommodate this complexity, which is applied in an analysis of pay regulation. Together, these inquiries form a comprehensive picture of the ways in which pay regulation sets incentives for CSR engagement. Finally, the thesis shows how CSR-oriented pay regulation is consistent with the conventional goals of corporate governance and eventually provides a prospect for the integration of CSR and corporate law in general.

Shareholder protection and stock market development

The dissertation contains five parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter starts from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial development literature. The commonly used methods in these cross-sectional analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments. Hence, the model uncertainty becomes a salient problem. The Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. The second Chapter looks into the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance regime on entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current literature focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur's control. As a result, the entrepreneur trade-offs the costs of monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection improves. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using panel data and GMM-sys estimator. The third Chapter investigates the corporate law and corporate governance reform in China. The corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the interests of stakeholders, which is inefficient. The Chapter combines the recent development of theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory and the property rights theory, to solve such problem. The enlightened shareholder value, which emphasizes on the long term valuation of the firm, should be adopted as objectives of listed firms. In addition, a move from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the default regime, is proposed.

La renuncia al ejercicio de la acción social de responsabilidad

En el presente estudio se aborda un tema, el del régimen jurídico de la renuncia a la acción social de responsabilidad, que ha sido objeto de un escaso tratamiento por parte de la doctrina española. Estamos ante una institución controvertida, que regula la posibilidad de que una sociedad de capital abandone voluntariamente las pretensiones indemnizatorias que pudiera ostentar frente a alguno de sus administradores por los daños que éstos hubieran ocasionado en el patrimonio social como consecuencia del incumplimiento sus deberes de diligencia y lealtad. El hecho de que una sociedad de capital pueda acordar esta renuncia es un claro indicio del carácter dispositivo de las normas que regulan la responsabilidad de los administradores frente a la sociedad. Después de abordar de los antecedentes y evolución histórica de la renuncia a la acción social, la primera parte del estudio se centra en el análisis del ámbito material y temporal de su régimen jurídico, concluyendo que éste regula no sólo la renuncia o la transacción procesal, sino que se aplica cualquier acuerdo de la junta general que tenga como efecto una exoneración total o parcial de los administradores. La segunda parte del estudio profundiza en el régimen jurídico de la renuncia, haciendo hincapié en el derecho de veto que la Ley española y el Codice civile reconocen a la minoría y que se configura como una auténtica excepción al principio mayoritario que rige, con carácter general, la formación de la voluntad social. En el último capítulo se analizan los efectos de la renuncia acordada por la junta sobre la legitimación extraordinaria que ostentan los socios minoritarios y los acreedores sociales para el ejercicio de la acción social.

I mercati di crescita per le PMI

La tesi studia ed approfondisce la disciplina dei mercati di crescita per le PMI, indagando il regime normativo delle società ivi quotate. Considerata la struttura composita dell’architettura regolamentare (direttive e regolamenti europei, fonti primarie nazionali e regolamento del mercato) l’indagine adotta una prospettiva olistica sulla regolamentazione, al fine di individuare principii comuni e risolevere dubbi interpretativi. Inoltre, l’approfondimento in chiave storica e di economia politica, volto a ricostruire le ragioni per l’introduzione dei mercati di crescita e gli obiettivi perseguiti dal legislatore europeo, permette di identificare le rationes sottostanti alle disposizioni e di facilitarne l’interpretazione. Il primo capitolo approfondisce l’evoluzione storica e istituzionale dei mercati di crescita per le PMI e gli obiettivi che il legislatore europeo si prefigge di raggiungere. Il secondo capitolo affronta invece il processo di registrazione dei sistemi multilaterali di negoziazione come mercati di crescita. Il capitolo indaga quali siano i requisiti affinché un sistema multilaterale possa essere registrato come mercato di crescita, come si svolga il processo di registrazione e quale sia il ruolo dell’autorità di vigilanza. Il terzo capitolo approfondisce quali siano le disposizioni di diritto societario applicabili agli emittenti quotati sui mercati di crescita. Infatti, mentre la disciplina per gli emittenti quotati sui mercati regolamentati non è direttamente applicabile a queste società, non si può neppure escludere in via preliminare che determinate disposizioni non siano applicabili in via analogica, a causa delle specifiche caratteristiche conferite a questi emittenti ed ai titoli ammessi alla negoziazione dalla quotazione. Il quarto capitolo analizza diverse disposizioni relative all’informazione, intesa in senso ampio. Infine, il quinto capitolo affronta la disciplina dell’o.p.a. obbligatoria prevista dal regolamento del mercato di crescita AIM Italia.

The Economic Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility

La tesi si pone due obiettivi principali. Il primo é quello di proporre una rassegna ragionata della letteratura di carattere economico sulla Responsabilitá Sociale d’Impresa (RSI), analizzando i maggiori elementi di possibile critica e i nodi rimasti irrisolti. Il secondo é quello di introdurre alcuni contributi originali a questa letteratura. Riguardo al secondo obiettivo, l’analisi economica della RSI si puó dividere in due rami: uno che vede la RSI principamente come strategia di differenziazione, e l’altro che la vede come strategia per migliorare l’efficienza del processo produttivo. Fino ad ora la letteratura economica si é concentrata esclusivamente sul primo. Nella mia tesi vengono sviluppati alcuni modelli teorici delle RSI come strategia per migliorare l'efficienza del processo produttivo. Uno dei principali risultati della tesi é che le imprese che appaiono socialmente responsabili non sono quelle che hanno rinunciato alla massimizazione dei profitti, ma quelle che hanno come obiettivo la massimizzazione dei profitti nel lungo periodo, tenendo in considerazione come le proprie attivitá possono influenzare la disponibilitá e la qualitá dei fattori di produzione nel futuro. Un altro risultato della tesi é lo studio delle configurazioni di equilibrio in diversi mercati, con riferimento a quante imprese decideranno di intraprendere RSI e quante decideranno di non farlo.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?

Bank Governance and the Bail-in in the EU. A Law & Finance analysis on the role of bail-inable creditors

This dissertation assesses the impact of the EU Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRRD) on bank corporate governance and investigates a fundamental question. Can the resolution framework for distressed banks enhance the quality of banks’ decision making? According to the Directive, the Resolution Authority can impose losses on bank’s creditors in case of distress through a bail-in. Bail-inable creditors become residual claimants of the bank, contingent on its distress. The first part of the dissertation establishes an analytical framework for bank governance, starting from the problem of what can be defined as “good governance” in banking. The dissertation hypothesizes that governance regulation represents a necessary link between the incentives of corporate constituencies and the goals of substantive regulation. The second part builds upon this analytical framework and carries out a positive analysis encompassing three channels of debt governance; namely, price internalisation of risk; contractual arrangements and the discrete impact of different type of creditors. The existence of a resolution framework should incentivise bail-inable creditors to better discipline the borrowing bank; yet, the design of both the capital and resolution regulation largely foreclose such possibility to creditors. Against this backdrop, the third part of the dissertation moves to normative considerations. The approach to this normative part combines and complements the study of cash flow rights of the management with the study of the voting rights to bail-inable creditors. On the cash flow side, the dissertation proposes to include bail-inable debt as part of the variable remuneration for bank risk-takers. On the voting right, the proposal is to grant a limited basket of ex-ante governance rights to bail-inable creditors. Such a unified approach is rather uncommon in the literature, where cash flow rights and voting rights are often approached separately whereas those complement each other in the dissertation.