Implications of Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts on Contract Law

Smart contracts are the most advanced blockchain applications. They can also be used in the contractual domain for the encoding and automatic execution of contract terms. Smart contracts already existed before the blockchain, but they take advantage of the characteristics of that technology. Namely, the decentralised and immutable characters of the blockchain determine that no single contracting party can control, modify, or interrupt the execution of smart contracts. As every new phenomenon, blockchain-based smart contracts have attracted the attention of institutions. For example, in its Resolution of 3 October 2018 on distributed ledger technologies and blockchain, the European Parliament has stressed the need to undertake an in-depth assessment of the legal implications,starting from the analysis of existing legal frameworks. Indeed, the present research thesis aims to verify how blockchain-based smart contracts fit into contract law. To this end, the analysis starts from the most discussed and relevant aspects and develops further considerations. Before that, it provides a detailed description and clarifications about the characteristics, the functioning, and the development of the technology, which is an essential starting point for a high-level quality legal analysis. It takes into considerations already existing rules concerning the use of technology in the life cycle of contracts, from vending machines to computable contracts, and verifies its applicability to blockchain-based smart contracts. The work does not limit to consider the mere technology, but some concrete scenarios of adoption of blockchain-based smart contracts in the contractual domain. Starting from the latter, it focuses on the implications of blockchain-based smart contracts on contract formation, contract performance, and applicable law and jurisdiction.

Ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims - A law and economics perspective

This research addresses the use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims in domestic settings using law and economics research methodologies. Potential economic benefits from using arbitration, particularly between informed and knowledgeable parties and in international business transactions, are not guaranteed in domestic disputes. Arbitration can potentially be used to manipulate the adjudication process. This research has several findings. There is a lack of information available concerning the use of arbitration to adjudicate tort claims. Proxy measurements concerning the demand for third party adjudication and other legal indicators are a poor substitute for the information hidden behind the veil of arbitration. There is the potential for the strategic use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims by repeat player tortfeasors to domestic tort claims, both individually and in concert with other repeat player firms. These strategic efforts aim to: manipulate enforcement errors for tort claims, avoid procedural rules which have the effect of lowering enforcement errors, enable a unique type of domestic forum arbitrage, shirk from taking due care, capture the economic benefit of using arbitration, manipulate the stock of precedents and production of public goods from courts, collude in these underlying efforts, restrain competition, indirectly fix prices, and other aims which increase the repeat player tortfeasor’s or their industries economic gains related to their underlying contracts and tort disputes. This research also demonstrates how this subject is appropriate for further academic research and why states should be cautious of giving carte blanche to arbitrate all domestic tort claims.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.

Regulating Vertical Agreements: A Comparative Law & Economics analysis of Brazil and Europe

This PhD thesis discusses antitrust enforcement of anti-competitive vertical agreements in Europe and in Brazil from an institutional perspective. It considers both the evolution of the legal framework and the application of the existing policies, with the analysis of case studies. The research highlights the main challenges of the current approaches adopted by the competition authorities in these jurisdictions and formulates specific proposals for future improvements. Because the Brazilian competition rules were originally inspired by the European legal framework, this thesis also summarizes the contemporary discussions regarding comparative law and the efficiency of transplanting laws and good practices. In a Law & Economics perspective, vertical agreements have always been a paradoxical topic and constitute one of the most dynamic disputes for antitrust enforcement. The reason for that concern is the fact that those contracts among companies are complex in nature. Taking into account this background, the thesis provides an original analysis of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements, based on the classical literature of Law & Economics. One of the novelties of the research is the extension of the economic analysis of vertical agreements to also consider new forms of contractual abuses in the context of digital markets, such as the contractual restrictions that are being put I practice in e-commerce platforms. The international comparative approach focuses on the Brazilian and European experiences, and opens up a reflection about the policy recommendations applied to several countries with similar economic and institutional realities.