Rebooting the constitutional debate: deliberative constitutionalism in the European Union

The aim of my thesis is to investigate the possibility and necessity to rethink a constitutional framework and debate in a transnational polity such as the European Union. My effort focuses on a promising theory called deliberative constitutionalism, which carries on new insights on how democracy and constitutions relate each other. The EU is a unique political entity which poses unanswered questions about its political legitimacy and constitutional foundation, if a Constitution will ever be possible. Going beyond the classical conception of the national and sovereign ‘people’, we keep wondering how citizens may deliberate and discuss about their rights and political communities across borders, in what could be defined as a transnational civic society. The development of the latter brings with it necessary constitutional changes, if not an evolution of constitutionalism itself. Chapter 1 deals with defining the theoretical framework, which develops the distinctiveness of the deliberative constitutional paradigm not only with respect to other more 'classical' models of democracy, but also with respect to other deliberative models that have marked the constructivist debate. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual history of constituent power, mainly studying the evolution of the constitution-sovereignty-constituent power dialectic, up to contemporary theories that explain the negation, separation, union or plurality of a transnational constituent with respect to its national counterparts. Chapter 3 develops the discourse of constitutional pluralism, through its main claims and strands that especially pertain to Neil Walker's (2002, 2016) institutional and epistemic claims. Chapter 4 applies a deliberative constitutionalist framework to the case of the European Union. Through the exposition of DC normative tenets, a form of self-learning process is proposed that can reconcile the heterarchical arrangement of constitutional claims and the new demand for legitimacy, as well as the relationship between European peoples and European citizens.

Transitional Justice as a Post-Revolution Constitutional Arrangement: A Law and Economics Approach

This dissertation addresses the timely questions of transitional justice (TJ) in the aftermath of revolutions against autocratic regimes, dealing with TJ as a constitutional arrangement through the lenses of constitutional economics. After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 deals with why nations rarely adopt meaningful TJ processes in the first place, it then explains the limitations of civil society as the arbiter, facilitator, and enforcer of TJ policies. Chapter 3 tackles the question of which mechanisms to choose? It uses the UN Guidelines on TJ that sets five principal TJ mechanisms. It provides a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of each mechanism and suggests policy implications accordingly. The CBA inspires chapter 4 analysis, suggesting a tradeoff between restrictive fair trial standards under constitutional laws and justice considerations. The tradeoff explains the suggested efficiency of the balanced TJ approaches that combine trials and amnesties. This approach is used for the case study analysis of TJ in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution in chapter 5. The chapter presents the first index of TJ mechanisms in Tunisia through novel data collected by the author. It shows an ultimate TJ design that ended with a modest harvest in the application. The lack of cooperation between the Tunisian parties, added to the absence of transparency in many TJ measures, threatens any possible positive outcomes of the partial TJ process. It is also alarming regarding constitutional compliance in a system that – until recently - was considered the only democracy in the Arab region. Chapter 6 is a summary

Comparative constitutional design for divided societies: a model to explain vonstitutional asymmetries

Comparative studies on constitutional design for divided societies indicate that there is no magic formula to the challenges that these societies pose, as lots of factors influence constitutional design. In the literature on asymmetric federalism, the introduction of constitutional asymmetries is considered a flexible instrument of ethnic conflict resolution, as it provides a mixture of the two main theoretical approaches to constitutional design for divided societies (i.e., integration and accommodation). Indeed, constitutional asymmetries are a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, as their degree of intensity can vary across constitutional systems, and there are both legal and extra-legal factors that may explain such differences. This thesis argues that constitutional asymmetries provide a flexible model of constitutional design and aims to explore the legal factors that are most likely to explain the different degrees of constitutional asymmetry in divided multi-tiered systems. To this end, the research adopts a qualitative methodology, i.e., Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which allows an understanding of whether a condition or combination of conditions (i.e., the legal factors) determine the outcome (i.e., high, medium, low degree of constitutional asymmetry, or constitutional symmetry). The QCA is conducted on 16 divided multi-tiered systems, and for each case, the degree of constitutional asymmetry was analyzed by employing standardized indexes on subnational autonomy, allowing for a more precise measure of constitutional asymmetry than has previously been provided in the literature. Overall, the research confirms the complex nature of constitutional asymmetries, as the degrees of asymmetries vary substantially not only across systems but also within cases among the dimensions of subnational autonomy. The outcome of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis also confirms a path of complex causality since the different degrees of constitutional asymmetry always depend on several legal factors, that combined produce a low, medium, or high degree of constitutional asymmetry or, conversely, constitutional symmetry.