Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS): An evaluation of success factors in the agricultural sector. The case of Italy's Emilia Romagna region.

Different tools have been used to set up and adopt the model for the fulfillment of the objective of this research. 1. The Model The base model that has been used is the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) adapted with the aim to perform a Benefit Cost Analysis. The AHP developed by Thomas Saaty is a multicriteria decision - making technique which decomposes a complex problem into a hierarchy. It is used to derive ratio scales from both discreet and continuous paired comparisons in multilevel hierarchic structures. These comparisons may be taken from actual measurements or from a fundamental scale that reflects the relative strength of preferences and feelings. 2. Tools and methods 2.1. The Expert Choice Software The software Expert Choice is a tool that allows each operator to easily implement the AHP model in every stage of the problem. 2.2. Personal Interviews to the farms For this research, the farms of the region Emilia Romagna certified EMAS have been detected. Information has been given by EMAS center in Wien. Personal interviews have been carried out to each farm in order to have a complete and realistic judgment of each criteria of the hierarchy. 2.3. Questionnaire A supporting questionnaire has also been delivered and used for the interviews . 3. Elaboration of the data After data collection, the data elaboration has taken place. The software support Expert Choice has been used . 4. Results of the Analysis The result of the figures above (vedere altro documento) gives a series of numbers which are fractions of the unit. This has to be interpreted as the relative contribution of each element to the fulfillment of the relative objective. So calculating the Benefits/costs ratio for each alternative the following will be obtained: Alternative One: Implement EMAS Benefits ratio: 0, 877 Costs ratio: 0, 815 Benfit/Cost ratio: 0,877/0,815=1,08 Alternative Two: Not Implement EMAS Benefits ratio: 0,123 Costs ration: 0,185 Benefit/Cost ratio: 0,123/0,185=0,66 As stated above, the alternative with the highest ratio will be the best solution for the organization. This means that the research carried out and the model implemented suggests that EMAS adoption in the agricultural sector is the best alternative. It has to be noted that the ratio is 1,08 which is a relatively low positive value. This shows the fragility of this conclusion and suggests a careful exam of the benefits and costs for each farm before adopting the scheme. On the other part, the result needs to be taken in consideration by the policy makers in order to enhance their intervention regarding the scheme adoption on the agricultural sector. According to the AHP elaboration of judgments we have the following main considerations on Benefits: - Legal compliance seems to be the most important benefit for the agricultural sector since its rank is 0,471 - The next two most important benefits are Improved internal organization (ranking 0,230) followed by Competitive advantage (ranking 0, 221) mostly due to the sub-element Improved image (ranking 0,743) Finally, even though Incentives are not ranked among the most important elements, the financial ones seem to have been decisive on the decision making process. According to the AHP elaboration of judgments we have the following main considerations on Costs: - External costs seem to be largely more important than the internal ones (ranking 0, 857 over 0,143) suggesting that Emas costs over consultancy and verification remain the biggest obstacle. - The implementation of the EMS is the most challenging element regarding the internal costs (ranking 0,750).

Reasoning with incomplete and imprecise preferences

Preferences are present in many real life situations but it is often difficult to quantify them giving a precise value. Sometimes preference values may be missing because of privacy reasons or because they are expensive to obtain or to produce. In some other situations the user of an automated system may have a vague idea of whats he wants. In this thesis we considered the general formalism of soft constraints, where preferences play a crucial role and we extended such a framework to handle both incomplete and imprecise preferences. In particular we provided new theoretical frameworks to handle such kinds of preferences. By admitting missing or imprecise preferences, solving a soft constraint problem becomes a different task. In fact, the new goal is to find solutions which are the best ones independently of the precise value the each preference may have. With this in mind we defined two notions of optimality: the possibly optimal solutions and the necessary optimal solutions, which are optimal no matter we assign a precise value to a missing or imprecise preference. We provided several algorithms, bases on both systematic and local search approaches, to find such kind of solutions. Moreover, we also studied the impact of our techniques also in a specific class of problems (the stable marriage problems) where imprecision and incompleteness have a specific meaning and up to now have been tackled with different techniques. In the context of the classical stable marriage problem we developed a fair method to randomly generate stable marriages of a given problem instance. Furthermore, we adapted our techniques to solve stable marriage problems with ties and incomplete lists, which are known to be NP-hard, obtaining good results both in terms of size of the returned marriage and in terms of steps need to find a solution.