How to explain: from theory to practice

Today we live in an age where the internet and artificial intelligence allow us to search for information through impressive amounts of data, opening up revolutionary new ways to make sense of reality and understand our world. However, it is still an area of improvement to exploit the full potential of large amounts of explainable information by distilling it automatically in an intuitive and user-centred explanation. For instance, different people (or artificial agents) may search for and request different types of information in a different order, so it is unlikely that a short explanation can suffice for all needs in the most generic case. Moreover, dumping a large portion of explainable information in a one-size-fits-all representation may also be sub-optimal, as the needed information may be scarce and dispersed across hundreds of pages. The aim of this work is to investigate how to automatically generate (user-centred) explanations from heterogeneous and large collections of data, with a focus on the concept of explanation in a broad sense, as a critical artefact for intelligence, regardless of whether it is human or robotic. Our approach builds on and extends Achinstein’s philosophical theory of explanations, where explaining is an illocutionary (i.e., broad but relevant) act of usefully answering questions. Specifically, we provide the theoretical foundations of Explanatory Artificial Intelligence (YAI), formally defining a user-centred explanatory tool and the space of all possible explanations, or explanatory space, generated by it. We present empirical results in support of our theory, showcasing the implementation of YAI tools and strategies for assessing explainability. To justify and evaluate the proposed theories and models, we considered case studies at the intersection of artificial intelligence and law, particularly European legislation. Our tools helped produce better explanations of software documentation and legal texts for humans and complex regulations for reinforcement learning agents.

Comparative constitutional design for divided societies: a model to explain vonstitutional asymmetries

Comparative studies on constitutional design for divided societies indicate that there is no magic formula to the challenges that these societies pose, as lots of factors influence constitutional design. In the literature on asymmetric federalism, the introduction of constitutional asymmetries is considered a flexible instrument of ethnic conflict resolution, as it provides a mixture of the two main theoretical approaches to constitutional design for divided societies (i.e., integration and accommodation). Indeed, constitutional asymmetries are a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, as their degree of intensity can vary across constitutional systems, and there are both legal and extra-legal factors that may explain such differences. This thesis argues that constitutional asymmetries provide a flexible model of constitutional design and aims to explore the legal factors that are most likely to explain the different degrees of constitutional asymmetry in divided multi-tiered systems. To this end, the research adopts a qualitative methodology, i.e., Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which allows an understanding of whether a condition or combination of conditions (i.e., the legal factors) determine the outcome (i.e., high, medium, low degree of constitutional asymmetry, or constitutional symmetry). The QCA is conducted on 16 divided multi-tiered systems, and for each case, the degree of constitutional asymmetry was analyzed by employing standardized indexes on subnational autonomy, allowing for a more precise measure of constitutional asymmetry than has previously been provided in the literature. Overall, the research confirms the complex nature of constitutional asymmetries, as the degrees of asymmetries vary substantially not only across systems but also within cases among the dimensions of subnational autonomy. The outcome of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis also confirms a path of complex causality since the different degrees of constitutional asymmetry always depend on several legal factors, that combined produce a low, medium, or high degree of constitutional asymmetry or, conversely, constitutional symmetry.