The European External Action Service and the Implementation of the 'Union Method' in European Foreign Policy

The European External Action Service (EEAS or Service) is one of the most significant and most debated innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This analysis intends to explain the anomalous design of the EEAS in light of its function, which consists in the promotion of external action coherence. Coherence is a principle of the EU legal system, which requires synergy in the external actions of the Union and its Members. It can be enforced only through the coordination of European policy-makers' initiatives, by bridging the gap between the 'Communitarian' and intergovernmental approaches. This is the 'Union method' envisaged by A. Merkel: "coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity - each of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal". The EEAS embodies the 'Union method', since it is institutionally linked to both Union organs and Member States. It is also capable of enhancing synergy in policy management and promoting unity in international representation, since its field of action is delimited not by an abstract concern for institutional balance but by a pragmatic assessment of the need for coordination in each sector. The challenge is now to make sure that this pragmatic approach is applied with respect to all the activities of the Service, in order to reinforce its effectiveness. The coordination brought by the EEAS is in fact the only means through which a European foreign policy can come into being: the choice is not between the Community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a coordinated position and nothing at all.

A threshold hypothesis of institutional change: collective action in the Italian Alps during the 13th - 19th centuries.

This dissertation is about collective action issues in common property resources. Its focus is the “threshold hypothesis,” which posits the existence of a threshold in group size that drives the process of institutional change. This hypothesis is tested using a six-century dataset concerning the management of the commons by hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps. The analysis seeks to determine the group size threshold and the institutional changes that occur when groups cross this threshold. There are five main findings. First, the number of individuals in villages remained stable for six centuries, despite the population in the region tripling in the same period. Second, the longitudinal analysis of face-to-face assemblies and community size led to the empirical identification of a threshold size that triggered the transition from informal to more formal regimes to manage common property resources. Third, when groups increased in size, gradual organizational changes took place: large groups split into independent subgroups or structured interactions into multiple layers while maintaining a single formal organization. Fourth, resource heterogeneity seemed to have had no significant impact on various institutional characteristics. Fifth, social heterogeneity showed statistically significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the relative importance of governance rules versus resource management rules. Overall, the empirical evidence from this research supports the “threshold hypothesis.” These findings shed light on the rationale of institutional change in common property regimes, and clarify the mechanisms of collective action in traditional societies. Further research may generalize these conclusions to other domains of collective action and to present-day applications.