Collaborative Change: Environmental Jolt, Network (Re)Design and Firm Performance

Motivated by the need to understand which are the underlying forces that trigger network evolution, we develop a multilevel theoretical and empirically testable model to examine the relationship between changes in the external environment and network change. We refer to network change as the dissolution or replacement of an interorganizational tie, adding also the case of the formation of new ties with new or preexisting partners. Previous research has paid scant attention to the organizational consequences of quantum change enveloping entire industries in favor of an emphasis on continuous change. To highlight radical change we introduce the concept of environmental jolt. The September 11 terrorist attacks provide us with a natural experiment to test our hypotheses on the antecedents and the consequences of network change. Since network change can be explained at multiple levels, we incorporate firm-level variables as moderators. The empirical setting is the global airline industry, which can be regarded as a constantly changing network of alliances. The study reveals that firms react to environmental jolts by forming homophilous ties and transitive triads as opposed to the non jolt periods. Moreover, we find that, all else being equal, firms that adopt a brokerage posture will have positive returns. However, we find that in the face of an environmental jolt brokerage relates negatively to firm performance. Furthermore, we find that the negative relationship between brokerage and performance during an environmental jolt is more significant for larger firms. Our findings suggest that jolts are an important predictor of network change, that they significantly affect operational returns and should be thus incorporated in studies of network dynamics.

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.