La carriera degli attori italiani di prosa dalla scena allo schermo (1909-1916)

Most actors of the Italian silent cinema in the early 1910s have a theatrical training. Some of them are already asserted or famous actors (like Cesare Dondini, Ermete Novelli, Ermete Zacconi, Giovanni Grasso) who are invited “to pose” for the cinema following their reputation, according to a strategy of an aesthetic and cultural legitimacy launched in 1909 by film d'art of the Pathé Consortium. I think it is the proverbial readiness and strength of the stage Italian actors that create a decisive contribution to the rapid development of the national cinema industry, despite its serious structural deficiencies, from the protoindustrialized phase (1909) to the golden age of divismo (starting in 1913), until the first signs of decadence (1919), and the so-called “fall” of the UCI production and distribution system. This is the main topic of the thesis: an investigation on the Italian stage actors engaged in the film industry (“from stage to screen” as the Italian title says, but in a “post-Vardac” approach) through many different sources: periodicals, memories, personal and business letters, and also contracts, found in several archive funds. A specific chapter is dedicated to the artistic career of Febo Mari (1881-1939), real name Alfredo Rodriguez, witch is a time-sample symptomatic of deep ties established between the growing film publishing and the Italian theatrical production system in the 1910s. The Mari debut in cinema and his ascent toward screen “divo” status coincides with the parable that leads from emergence to decadence of divismo in Italy.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

L'amministrazione Johnson e le origini della distensione. 1964-1968

La tesi analizza una parte della politica estera dell’amministrazione Johnson, e più specificamente l’avvio del dialogo con l’Urss in materia di non proliferazione e controllo degli armamenti e la revisione della China policy, inquadrando entrambe nell’adattamento della cold war strategy all’evoluzione sistema internazionale, argomentando che la distensione intesa come rilassamento delle tensioni e ricerca di terreno comune per il dialogo, fosse perlomeno uno degli strumenti politici che l’amministrazione scelse di usare. Il primo capitolo analizza i cambiamenti che interessarono il Blocco sovietico e il movimento comunista internazionale tra la fine degli anni Cinquanta e l’inizio degli anni Sessanta, soprattutto la rottura dell’alleanza sino-sovietica, e l’impatto che essi ebbero sul sistema bipolare su cui si basava la Guerra Fredda. Il capitolo secondo affronta più specificamente l’evoluzione delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica, il perseguimento di una politica di distensione, dopo la crisi dei missili cubani, e in che relazione si trovasse ciò con lo status della leadership sovietica a seguito dei cambiamenti che avevano avuto luogo. Soffermandosi sulla questione del controllo degli armamenti e sul percorso che portò alla firma del Trattato di Non-proliferazione, si analizza come la nuova rotta intrapresa col dialogo sulle questioni strategiche sia stato anche un cambiamento di rotta in generale nella concezione della Guerra Fredda e l’introduzione della distensione come strumento politico. Il terzo capitolo affronta la questione della modifica della politica verso Pechino e il processo tortuoso e contorto attraverso cui l’amministrazione Johnson giunse a distaccarsi dalla China policy seguita sino ad allora.