Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

The Road to Poverty Reduction: Corporate Governance and Female Participation in MFIs

1.Microfinance Industry – Context of Analysis. This paper is an introduction to the microfinance industry. It serves as a context of analysis, for the empirical settings and basis for building the theoretical argument for the thesis. 2.Women in Microfinance Institutions: The Road to Poverty Reduction and Gender Equality? One of the unique aspects of microfinance institutions is their focus on outreach, i.e. their ability to reach the poor. This paper explores whether the presence of women in microfinance institutions is associated with improved outreach. Building on prior research that shows that women tend to improve financial performance and social responsibility, we examine an original dataset of 226 microfinance institutions. The empirical results suggest that the presence of a female CEO, female managers and female loan officers is directly related to improved outreach, while the presence of women board members is not. 3. Women in Microfinance Institutions: Is There a Trade-Off Between Outreach and Sustainability? Abstract This paper’s contribution to the understanding of microfinance is two-fold. First, while it has been shown that female CEOs in MFIs increase financial performance, it will be argued that female managers, female loan officers and female board members will do the same. Secondly, having previously shown that having a female presence in management in MFIs improves social performance the outreach, it will be argued that having females in the MFIs’ management will not lead to a trade-off between outreach and sustainability. These findings are based on an original data set of 226 MFIs. Statistical analysis demonstrates that a weak relationship between female managers and female loan officers vis-à-vis financial performance, but female board members do not. The trade-off between outreach and sustainability can be avoided with the appointment of females to the MFIs’ management positions, but the same cannot be concluded for female board members.